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ARTICLES
PRESIDENT OR KING? THE USE AND ABUSE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDERS IN MODERN-DAY AMERICA
Tara L. Branum*
Stroke of the pen, law of the land. Kind of cool.
-- former Clinton advisor Paul Begalal
Don't be fooled... the pen that can wipe out a man's very existence is still
there. Right now the pen is held by a more decent hand, that's all.
-anonymous Hungarian tourist 2
* Associate, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Houston, Texas. J.D. University of Texas;
Austin, Texas (2001); B.A. Rice University; Houston, Texas (1994). Texas Review of
Law & Politics; Editor-in-Chief (Spring 2000-Spring 2001), Managing Editor (Fall
1999). The author would like to thank Mr. Doug Wilson and Mr. Steve Bryant for their
thoughtful comments on early drafts of this article. The opinions and views expressed
herein are those of the author only.
1. Frank J. Murray, Clinton's Executive Orders Still Are Packing a Punch: Other
Presidents Issued More, But Many of His Are Sweeping, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1999,
at Al.
2. Balint Vazsonyi, Guiding the Pen, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1999, at A14. The
tourist was not commenting on the use of presidential directives by the President of the
United States; rather, he was referring to the changed atmosphere in Eastern Europe
following the end of the Cold War. See id. The President is not supposed to have such
an "executive pen" under the United States Constitution; however, many allege that the
President essentially has such a pen today, as presidents are freely issuing an increasing
number of executive orders and other directives on a wider range of policy matters. See
id.; see also, e.g., Catherine Edwards, Emergency Rule, Abuse of Power?, INSIGHT ON
THE NEWS, Aug. 23, 1999, at 18 (noting that "one stealth presidency after another" has
usurped legislative power from Congress); J.R. Labbe, Executive Orders Tend to Usurp
Congress' Power, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 7, 2000, at B9 (comparing presi-
dential executive orders to Russian imperial proclamations). Some commentators are
even harsher and allege that recent users of the executive pen have not been "restrained
by any of the considerations that informed and guided U.S. presidents since George
Washington" and are thus not "decent" holders of the executive pen. Vazsonyi, supra.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The increased use of executive orders and other presidential directives is a
fundamental problem in modern-day America. The Constitution does not give
one individual an "executive pen" enabling that individual to single-handedly
write his preferred policy into law. Despite this lack of constitutional authority,
presidential directives have been increasingly used-both by Republicans and
Democrats3  o promulgate laws and to support public policy initiatives in a
manner that circumvents the proper lawmaking body, the United States Con-
gress.
It would be foolhardy to ignore the danger inherent in this situation, simply
because one might like the individual currently holding the presidential pen. 4 It
would be hypocritical, as well as dangerous, to seek change when a president
from the opposing political party is in power, but to ignore the problem once a
president from one's own party has been elected.5 While the current president
3. E.g., Congressional Limitation of Executive Orders: Hearing on H.R. 3131, H.
Con. Res. 30, and H.R. 2655 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 3 (1999) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R.
3131] (statement of Hon. George Gekas, Chairman, Subcomm. on Commercial and
Admin. Law) ("Every Administration in recent history has issued controversial Execu-
tive orders. There is no need to single out any particular Administration or order.").
Other congressional members have made similar statements. Congressman Jack
Metcalf has stated:
It is important to note that our current President is not the only one at fault.
I am criticizing many of the Presidents. A steady increase in controversy over
Presidential directives has arisen since FDR's administration. The use of
these directives is a constitutional issue, and I am not distinguishing between
Republican or Democrat Presidents. They have all been guilty as have those
of us in Congress who sometimes find it politically convenient to allow the
President to wield such broad power just with a stroke of the pen.
Id. at 14-15 (testimony of Hon. Jack Metcalf, Rep. of Congress, State of Washington)
[hereinafter Testimony of Hon. Jack Metcalf].
4. See, e.g., Editorial, "Stroke of the Pen," RICH. TIMEs DISPATCH, July 25, 1998, at
A8 ("It [Paul Begala's statement] is kind of disconcerting-not merely for Clinton foes,
but for ardent liberals who might imagine, say, Jesse Helms wielding the presidential
pen in a similar fashion. Political winds change. If Bill Clinton's legacy includes the
habitual use of executive orders-of rule by decree-that would be a legacy Clinton
supporters could come to regret."). Such a sentiment reinforces the reasons for Republi-
cans to act now to rein in the use of presidential power. Imagine the horror of conserva-
tives across the country if Hillary Clinton were to be elected president in 2004 or 2008,
particularly given the current state of presidential power.
5. Judge Kenneth W. Starr made an analogous point concerning the failure of Con-
gress to abide by constitutional guidelines when writing and approving the now-expired
Independent Counsel Act. Danger lies in failure to abide by the checks and balances
inherent in the system, regardless of the presently good--or bad--character of those in
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may back acceptable policies or refrain from using his executive power in a
tyrannical fashion, there is no guarantee that all future presidents will continue
to do so as well.
Controversy over the nature of executive power and the limitations that
should be placed upon it is not new.6 Since the founding of our country, Presi-
dents, congressmen, scholars, and individual citizens have sought to properly
define the boundaries of the executive's power. Two Presidents who served in
the early 1900s are often said to exemplify the two opposing views on the
proper use of executive power.7 President Theodore Roosevelt, a proponent of a
powerful executive, once stated:
The most important factor in getting the right spirit in my Administra-
tion, next to insistence upon courage, honesty, and a genuine democracy of
desire to serve the plain people, was my insistence upon the theory that the
executive power was limited only by specific restrictions and prohibitions
appearing in the Constitution or imposed by Congress under its constitutional
powers .... I declined to adopt this view that what was imperatively neces-
sary for the Nation could not be done by the President, unless he could find
some specific authorization to do it.'
In President Roosevelt's view, the executive power is all-inclusive, limited
only when such restrictions are specifically imposed. In contrast, other presi-
office.
It does little good to rail against the particular occupants of office. This too shall
pass. And there will be in our future, God willing, great public servants who answer
the call to duty, and then there will be others who will fall short of that high and noble
calling. The point is that the violation of structural integrity led directly to these most
unfortunate events, when the Justice Department performed so poorly in carrying out
its responsibilities. There were too many structural incentives to wish our office ill,
and there was not present the character, the integrity, to guard against the incentives
created by the anticonstitutional structure fashioned by the 1978 Congress, laboring,
as it was, under the heavy burdens of Watergate.
Kenneth W. Starr, Morality, Law and the Constitution: The Genius of the Founding
Generation, IMPRIMIS, July 2000, at 4.
6. COMM. ON GOVT. OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 14 (Comm. Print 1957)
[hereinafter STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS] ("The nature and limitations of Execu-
tive Power have been a matter of controversy from the very beginning of our Nation.").
7. See id. at 14-15.
8. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, NOTES FOR A POSSIBLE AUTOBIOGRAPHY, cited in
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS POWERS 143 (4th prtg., Columbia
Paperback ed. 1967) (emphasis added). President Roosevelt added, "'I did not usurp
power but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power."' Id., cited in TAFT, supra,
at 143.
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dents have held to the view that the executive power is not all-inclusive, but
rather exists only where specifically granted. President Roosevelt's successor,
William Howard Taft, was a famous proponent of this more restricted view of
the executive power. He stated:
The true view of the Executive functions is, as I conceive it, that the
President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced
to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such
express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise. Such specific grant
must be either in the Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in
pursuance thereof. There is no undefined residuum of power which he can
exercise because it seems to him to be in the public interest .... 9
So the question remains: What is the proper nature of executive power?
This article addresses the nature of executive power specifically as it relates to
the issuance of executive orders and other presidential directives.10 It argues
that the President exceeds his constitutional authority when he uses presidential
directives to set policy and make laws, a responsibility that the Constitution
expressly grants to Congress. In reaching this conclusion, this article first looks
at the intent of the Founding Fathers and the history of presidential directives in
Part II. Next, Part III evaluates recent trends in the use of presidential directives
that stand in contradiction to the intent of the Framers. It also briefly considers
the wartime uses of presidential directives by President Bush. Part IV analyzes
the limited amount of case law on this subject, while Part V discusses recent
aborted attempts by Congress and individuals to curb presidential lawmaking by
executive order or other directive. Last, Part VI makes recommendations to
President Bush for the use of executive orders during the remainder of his time
9. Id. at 139-40 (emphasis added). Regarding President Roosevelt's view, President
Taft stated, "My judgment is that the view of Mr. Garfield and Mr. Roosevelt, ascribing
an undefined residuum of power to the President is an unsafe doctrine and that it might
lead under emergencies to results of an arbitrary character, doing irremediable injustice
to private right." Id. at 144.
10. Executive power is a wide and varied topic. The focus of this article is on presi-
dential directives as they have been used in the domestic policy arena, particularly in
recent decades. This article does not address other types of executive power, such as the
war power, except as they relate tangentially to domestic topics. Neither does this arti-
cle seek to explore in depth the President's power in foreign affairs unless, again, it
relates tangentially to the topic of presidential directives as used in the domestic arena.
A deeper analysis of these and related topics is beyond the scope of this article. For a
brief discussion of President Bush's use of executive orders in relation to the war on
terrorism, however, see Part IU.B.2.b.
[Vol. 28
2002] President or King? Executive Orders 5
in office, particularly if the recently-started war proves to be one of extended
duration.
It is imperative that the Bush administration and those that follow it use
presidential directives in a manner that is in compliance with the Constitution
and the principle of separation of powers. If any president fails to do so, it is
incumbent upon both Congress and the American people to hold that president
accountable for his actions. The inherent danger in not doing so may have best
been expressed by President Rutherford B. Hayes, who stated that ""'[the real
test has never come, because the Presidents have down to the present been con-
servative, or what might be called conscientious men, and have kept within lim-
ited range .... But if a Napoleon ever became President, he could make the ex-
ecutive almost what he wished to make it."' 11
UI. THE HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Originally, executive orders and other directives were used primarily as
administrative tools.12 They were informal in nature and were usually, although
not always, fairly uncontroversial. This administrative use of presidential direc-
tives fell in line with the Framers' vision of the new, tripartite government: It
would rely upon a separation of powers among the branches to secure the peo-
ple's liberty. It was understood in the early days of our Republic that the power
to legislate and to decide policy was the province of Congress. The President's
role in lawmaking was limited to his veto power and his authority to recommend
legislation for consideration. Presidential directives were issued in accordance
with this understanding.
11. WILLIAM J. OLSON & ALAN WOLL, CATO INSTITUTE, EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND
NATIONAL EMERGENCIES: How PRESIDENTS HAVE COME TO "RUN THE COUNTRY" BY
USURPING LEGISLATIVE POWER 14 (1999) (quoting DAVID WATSON, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS HISTORY, APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION
930n (1910) (quoting Interview with Rutherford B. Hayes, President of the United
States)), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-358es.html.
12. Initially, presidential directives were used in line with a more restricted view of
presidential power. For instance, President Washington's view was that the President is
merely to "'administer the executive government of the United States."' George Will,
Hearing With Your Third Ear, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 13, 2000, at 100, 100 (quoting George
Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796)). In assessing the change in Americans'
views of the role of the President since the time of Washington, Mr. Will added, "Time
was, that is how presidents were understood-modestly, as administrators who executed
the will of others. Nowadays, presidents permeate the federal leviathan with their wills,
and they, like it, are everywhere." Id.
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Over the years, however, presidential power has increasingly grown to in-
clude lawmaking functions. 3 Initially, this change was prompted by several
national crises-the Civil War, the Great Depression, and the World Wars. Un-
fortunately, once the crises were over, presidential power did not revert back to
its former limits. An expansion of executive power that was questionable, at
best, during times of true emergency, has now become a threat to our liberty.
The country today faces a new crisis and, with it, the risk of a further escalation
of presidential power. It is imperative that President Bush take into considera-
tion this tendency of executive power to grow and threaten freedom. He should
act thoughtfully, deliberately, and properly as he seeks to achieve a balance be-
tween being a strong wartime leader and avoiding actions that are beyond the
scope of his powers. He should not assume that any constitutionally unjustifi-
able actions that he takes will be seen solely as "wartime" or "emergency"
measures, soon to be relegated to the pages of history. Past experience has
shown that this will not be the case.
In order to show how executive orders and other presidential directives
have evolved to a point so far removed from the Founders' original vision, this
section looks first at the nature of the executive order itself. Next, it looks at the
circumstances existing at the time of the Constitutional Convention and the
Framers' understanding of separation of powers. Finally, this section discusses
modem trends in the use of presidential directives; specifically, it looks at the
changing nature of presidential directives issued by presidents through the years.
A. The Nature of Executive Orders
Although there is no constitutional or statutory definition of "executive or-
der, '' 14 a congressional study has defined executive orders as "directives or ac-
tions by the President" that have the "force and effect of law" when "founded on
the authority of the President derived from the Constitution or [a] statute."15
While an executive order constitutes perhaps the most widely discussed form in
which a presidential directive may be issued, it is not the only type of presiden-
13. See id.
14. STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that no law or execu-
tive order attempts to define either "executive order" or "proclamation"); OLSON &
WOLL, supra note 11, at 8 (noting the lack of a statutory or constitutional definition
either for executive orders or for other types of presidential directives); see also Hearing
on H.R. 3131, supra note 3, at 55 (statement of Thomas B. Griffith, Wiley, Rein &
Fielding, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Statement of Thomas B. Griffith] ("[Tihe Con-
stitution does not include any reference to executive orders, and therefore neither author-
izes their use nor demarcates their limitations.").
15. STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 1.
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tial order. Presidents may also issue proclamations,16 presidential signing state-
ments, 17 presidential memoranda,' 8 or National Security Presidential Direc-
tives,19 among other types of presidential directives. In general, however, the
difference is typically one of form, not substance. This article primarily dis-
cusses executive orders, as they are the most common form of presidential order
16. The primary difference between an executive order and a proclamation is that an
executive order is typically an internal order directed at government officials and agen-
cies, while a proclamation is usually directed at those outside the government. Hearing
on H.R. 3131, supra note 3, at 47 (statement of Phillip Cooper, Gund Prof. of Liberal
Arts, Dep't of Pol. Sci., Univ. of Vermont) [hereinafter Statement of Phillip Cooper]
(citing STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 1). However, the lines be-
tween the two are often blurred, and the Supreme Court has held that there is no differ-
ence between the two in terms of legal effect. Id. (citing Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U.S.
755, 770 (1879)).
17. Presidential signing statements are usually issued when the President signs legis-
lation, and they may either contain "congratulatory recognitions" to those working on
the bill or may express the President's disagreement with certain sections of the bill. Id.
at 49. The latter are directed to agency heads charged with implementation of the new
law. Id. ("The agency head receiving such a directive understands not only that this it
[sic] indicates the political position of the administration, but also that the Justice De-
partment will not be prepared to support the administration should he or she seek to
depart from the mandated course of action.").
18. Presidential memoranda are often issued at the same time as an executive order
and may contain "significant additions to or interpretations of' the provisions in the
executive order. Id. at 48. Although recent usage of presidential memoranda has most
often been in conjunction with executive orders as outlined above, original usage was
somewhat different. Until recently, the most prominent use of presidential memoranda
was to make findings required by legislation, particularly in the area of foreign policy,
or to give formal notice when initiating a process. See id.
19. "National Security Presidential Directives" appears to be the designation that the
Bush II administration has given to its directives dealing with foreign policy issues.
HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES:
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 11-12 (2001) (CRS Report No. 98-611). This type of
foreign policy directive has changed names many times over the years. Statement of
Phillip Cooper, supra note 16, at 47. During the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,
the order was termed a "National Security Action Memorandum." Presidents Truman
and Eisenhower styled them "National Security Council Policy Papers," while President
Nixon changed the name, yet again, to "National Security Decision Memorandum."
The name of the order was changed again by President Carter ("Presidential Direc-
tives"), President George H.W. Bush ("National Security Directives"), and finally, by
President Clinton ("Presidential Decision Directives"). Id. These directives are typi-
cally focused on foreign policy issues, but some also have a domestic impact. Many are
classified, and Congress may not even be notified of their existence. Id.
2002]
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and also the most easily traced; however, the analysis of executive orders herein
can apply to any type of presidential directive.
20
A system for numbering executive orders was not established until 1907.21
At that point, all orders then on file were retroactively numbered, beginning
with the "first" executive order, an order issued by President Lincoln on October
20, 1862, establishing military courts in Louisiana.22 Numbering of orders after
1907 remained somewhat informal until the Federal Register Act of 1935 estab-
lished formal procedures.2 3 Today, all new executive orders must be filed with
the Division of the Federal Register, which assigns numbers to the executive
orders.24 If an old executive order is found, it is assigned a number with a suffix
"in between" other numbered executive orders in the same time period. Despite
efforts to find and number all old executive orders, however, many orders issued
before 1935 remain undiscovered and, thus, unnumbered.2
The official numbering of executive orders has surpassed 13,000. Due,
however, to the large number of executive orders that have never been found or
numbered, it is impossible to know exactly how many have been issued since
the time of President Washington. In addition, the wide range of presidential
action possible-including classified Presidential Decision Directives-makes it
difficult to estimate how many orders have actually been issued.26 At the time
of a 1957 congressional study on executive orders, estimates ranged from
15,000 to 50,000.27 In the nearly fifty years since that congressional study, it is
20. See discussion supra note 16. The most prominent types of presidential orders,
however, are executive orders and proclamations. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 8.
21. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 13.
22. STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 37.
23. Id.
24. Id. The Federal Register Act requires that executive orders and proclamations be
published. However, no similar requirement exists for other presidential directives, such
as presidential memoranda or National Security Presidential Directives. See Statement
of Phillip Cooper, supra note 16, at 50.
25. Id. Some of these older executive orders were extremely informal. For instance,
a President might simply write "approved" or "let it be done" across a recommendation
of one of his advisors. In other instances, the President's secretary or a cabinet member
might sign the executive order if the President were unavailable for signing but had
approved the order. For instance, Executive Order 113 was signed by President McKin-
ley's secretary. It ordered that the American flag be flown at half-mast while the
remains of John A. Rawlins were removed to Arlington cemetery. Id. at 35.
26. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
27. STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 37; see also Statement of Phil-
lip Cooper, supra note 16, at 46 (noting that estimated numbers for executive orders
range as high as 50,000).
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not unreasonable to assume that the current number would reflect an exponential
increase.
The first twenty-four Presidents issued 1262 executive orders.28 The last
seventeen Presidents (not including the current Bush administration) issued
11,855 orders. 29 However, the statistics are a mere reflection of the real prob-
lem that has arisen in the area of executive orders and other presidential direc-
tives. Americans have grown concerned about the use of presidential orders not
because of the number of orders issued, but because of the changed nature of the
issues being determined by these orders. 30 As government grows and individu-
als increasingly seek federal solutions to state or personal problems, so the na-
ture of presidential directives has evolved to keep up with these changing-if
unconstitutional-demands. Originally, presidents used directives merely as
administrative tools. In recent years, however, presidential orders have not
merely impacted government employees, but they have also impacted individu-
als outside the government. 31 Even worse, orders are sometimes used in lieu of
the legislative process.
32
28. Press Release, Sen. Mike Crapo, Time to Curb Abuse of Executive Orders (Nov.
1, 1999), available at http://www.thelibertycommittee.org/s1795craporelease.htm.
29. As of October 1999, 11,798 executive orders had been issued by the last seven-
teen Presidents. Id. President Clinton issued four executive orders in November and
December of 1999; he also issued fifty-three executive orders in 2000 and 2001, raising
the 11,798 total to 11,855. See Federal Register, Executive Orders Disposition Tables:
William J. Clinton-1999, National Archives and Records Administration, at
http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/eo1999.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2001); see also Federal
Register, Executive Orders Disposition Tables: Administration of William J. Clinton
(1993-2001), National Archives and Records Administration, at
http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/eoclint.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2001).
30. See John A. Sterling, Above the Law: Evolution of Executive Orders (Part One),
31 UWLA L. REv. 99, 100 (2000) ("For many years, the average American was com-
pletely unaware of the existence of Executive Orders. They operated quietly in the
background of government operation-useful tools in the hands of a capable executive
for the administration of his employees. Recent attention has been focused on Executive
Orders because they no longer operate only on the employees of the administrative
agencies of the Federal Government but on average citizens who perceive what appears
to be an end-run around the Constitution.").
31. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 18 (noting that Americans have remained rela-
tively unaware through the years as, one after another, each successive president has
usurped more legislative power through the use of executive orders). William Olson, a
constitutional lawyer and former Reagan official, stated, "In George Washington's day,
executive orders were no more than administrative directives to federal employees ....
[Now they are] a deliberate strategy to circumvent the Congress and the legislative func-
tion." Id.
32. See discussion infra Part III.A.
2002]
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Not surprisingly, some congressional and other policy leaders have noticed
this change in the use of presidential directives, and they are seeking not only to
increase public awareness of this problem, 33 but also to find tools to hold the
President accountable for the manner in which he uses his power.34 These pol-
icy leaders argue that the intent of the Founding Fathers was to create a govern-
ment of limited powers. By allowing presidents to continue on their current
course, they argue that Congress is essentially ceding to the executive branch its
constitutional duty to act as the lawmaking branch of government. Congress
should instead assert its authority to restore the separation of powers intended by
the Framers of our Constitution.35
33. Cf, e.g., Executive Orders: Hearing on The Impact of Executive Orders on the
Legislative Process: Executive Lawmaking? Before the Subcomm. on Legislative and
Budget Process of the House Comm. on Rules, 106th Cong. 28-29 (1999) [hereinafter
Hearing on Executive Orders] (statement of Thomas 0. Sargentich, Prof. of Constitu-
tional and Administrative Law, Wash. College of Law, American Univ.) [hereinafter
Statement of Thomas 0. Sargentich] ("I don't think the public appreciates the extent to
which law-making is conducted by the executive branch. Congress, of course, is the
national legislature, but you have delegated unnecessarily broad powers in many, many
statutes to agencies of the government and, of course, to the President.").
34. Perhaps the best indicator of this concern is the increased number of congres-
sional bills seeking to curb the President's use of executive orders-as well as the high
number of co-sponsors on some of these bills. See The Separation of Powers Restora-
tion Act, H.R. 864, 107th Cong. (2001); The Presidential Order Limitation Act of 2001,
H.R. 23, 107th Cong. (2001); The Executive Orders Limitation Act of 1999, S. 1795,
106th Cong. (1999); The Separation of Powers Restoration Act, H.R. 2655, 106th Cong.
(1999); H.R. Con. Res. 236, 105th Cong. (1998); The Presidential Directives and Re-
cords Accountability Act, H.R. 5438, 101st Cong. (1990). Although several recent bills
have sought to restrain the President's use of executive orders as a general matter, most
legislation in this regard is still aimed at a specific executive order that has been issued,
whether it is to affirm the policy or to overrule it. E.g., The Terrorist Elimination Act of
1998, H.R. 4861, 105th Cong. (1998); The Federalism Act of 1998, H.R. 4422, 105th
Cong. (1998); The State Sovereignty Act of 1998, H.R. 4196, 105th Cong. (1998); The
Fairness in Federal Contracting Act of 1995, S. 989, 104th Cong. (1995).
35. See Hearing on H.R. 3131, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Hon. Bob Barr, Rep.
of Congress, State of Georgia) [hereinafter Statement of Hon. Bob Barr] ("By intent,
history and express language, ours is a government of limited powers. This is enshrined
in the Constitution itself.... [It] was clearly the intent of our Founding Fathers. ...
However, in recent years, certainly not beginning with this administration or the imme-
diately preceding one or the one before that, we have drifted quite far from that funda-
mental principle of limited express powers, going as far back, especially in modern
times, as President Teddy Roosevelt."). William Olson similarly stated, "Congress has
been asleep at the switch, at least since Teddy Roosevelt, and it is very difficult all these
years later to transplant a backbone into Congress but essential that it be done." Murray,
supra note 1.
[Vol. 28
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B. Intent of the Framers
To ascertain the original intent of our Founding Fathers, it is first important
to remember the circumstances under which the Constitution was written. To
some degree, the political theories of the Framers may have been influenced by
the political philosophers of their day,36 but primarily, they were influenced by
their observations of history37 and by their personal experiences as colonists
under the English King.38 The sense of oppression that they had experienced,
both under the English monarchy and also under many of the colonial gover-
nors, left the colonists with a fear of unchecked executive power.39 As a result,
36. Among the philosophers impacting the political theories of the colonists was
Montesquieu, who is well known for his insistence that there be a division of power
within government in order to protect the freedom of those so governed. See TAFr,
supra note 8, at 1. President Taft asserted that the division of powers in the American
Constitution is clearer than the division of powers in the English constitution. Id. But
see FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
179 (1994) (asserting that the Founders did not adhere to the Montesquieuan doctrine of
separating powers as strictly as commonly believed, although it was endorsed "as an
abstract principle").
37. See generally MCDONALD, supra note 36, at 67-124 (discussing the historical
and political events that would have influenced the Americans at the Constitutional
Convention). McDonald notes that the Founders cited biblical history more often than
Montesquieu, Bolingbroke, and Hume combined. Id. at 68. Similarly, lessons were
gleaned from Roman, Greek, and English history. See id. at 72, 79, 89. The overall
lesson centered around the dangers of unchecked executive powers.
38. Id. at 98-124. The colonists sought to create a political system that could be dis-
tinguished from the oppressive feudalist system in England. See Louis Hartz, The Con-
cept of a Liberal Society, in CLASSIC READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 11, 11 (Pietro S.
Nivola & David H. Rosenbloom eds., 2d ed. 1990). For a description of the oppression
experienced by the colonists prior to the American Revolution and its impact on their
mindset, see MARVIN OLASKY, FIGHTING FOR LIBERTY AND VIRTUE (1995).
39. The governors appointed to the colonies during the 1700s were known for their
arbitrary and tyrannical decisions-as well as their willingness to be bribed. See
OLASKY, supra note 38, at 21-43. Colonists spent much of their time fighting to limit
royal power (as expressed through the governors) and seeking smaller government. Id.
at 38-39, 43. In the early part of the century, they won small victories in this regard.
The colonists considered "each successful assertion of authority ... a precedent ...
[that] kings or courtiers ... [violated] at their own peril." Id. at 42. From the perspec-
tive of those in England, however, "London's winks and nods were temporary peace-
keeping measures, and in time, more aggressive administrations could take steps to
bring the colonists to heel." Id. at 38. These different perspectives caused many prob-
lems later when London sought to re-establish the royal executive power in the Ameri-
can colonies.
Forrest McDonald similarly notes that the sense of betrayal felt by the American
colonists was even more complete in contrast to the intensity with which they had previ-
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they sought to create a government that escaped tyrannical, one-man rule and
instead granted its citizens the ability to govern themselves effectively. The
Articles of Confederation had proven an ineffective solution, as government had
remained too centralized. 4° As discussed further below, the Founders eventually
determined that a government separating powers among tripartite branches was
the best method of accomplishing their goal while allowing personal liberties to
be preserved.
Most importantly, the lessons of history had taught the Founding Fathers
one inescapable fact about human nature: They "believed in original sin, be-
lieved that man has a nature that is unchanging and base.' 4 They did not hold
to the belief that all-or even some-men are ultimately willing and able to
consistently act in a completely unselfish manner when entrusted with un-
checked power.42 Instead, they "understood that man is inherently flawed, im-
perfect and imperfectible, driven by selfish desires." 43 They had seen too much
ously believed in the King and his intent to serve the welfare of the colonies.
MCDONALD, supra note 36, at 124 ("The news [that the King had pronounced the colo-
nists "rebels"] was even more shattering precisely because belief in the virtue of this
Patriot King had been intense. No people could have felt more betrayed. It seemed
unlikely that Americans would ever believe in executive authority again.").
40. See Pasco Bowman, The Separation of Powers: Myth or Reality?, in DERAILING
THE CONSTITUTION 114, 114-15 (Edward B. McLean ed., 1995) (noting that the Found-
ing Fathers were not only recovering from the tyrannical rule of George II, but also
from the centralized authority structure of the Articles of Confederation). Many Ameri-
cans had viewed a lack of separation of powers to be a major flaw in the governmental
structure created by the Articles of Confederation. But see GERHARD CASPER,
SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 16-17 (1997). Stanford Uni-
versity President Gerhard Casper has asserted that the lack of separation of powers may
not have been as important to the colonists as we now believe. He notes that John
Randolph, in opening the 1787 Constitutional Convention, did not mention separation of
powers when enumerating the defects in the Confederation. Id. at 17. The Virginia Plan
submitted that day did imply the importance of a division of powers; subsequent plans
pre-supposed a tripartite system. Id.
41. Forrest McDonald, I Have Seen the Past and It Works, in DERAILING THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 40, at 30, 33.
42. Id. ("They were utterly contemptuous of abstract political theories based upon
the notion that man and society are perfectible, or that evil can be eradicated, or that
man can be taught to be other than self-interested, or that man is or can become a crea-
ture governed by reason .... "). Anti-Federalists shared the view that humans are inher-
ently corruptible when given unchecked power. One anti-Federalist argued that "[tihose
who have governed, have been found in all ages ever active to enlarge their powers and
abridge the public liberty." "Brutus," Brutus II, Liberty Library of Constitutional Clas-
sics, Constitution Society (Nov. 1, 1787), at http://www.constitution.org/afp/brutus02.
htm.
43. McDonald, supra note 41, at 33; see also Vazsonyi, supra note 2 ("But the mira-
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abuse of power to believe otherwise, and any government created by these pa-
triots would reflect these beliefs about human nature.
1. The Importance of Separation of Powers
It is indisputable that the Founding Fathers placed great importance on
governmental division of powers" and sought to incorporate this division into
the Constitution as it was being prepared for ratification by the thirteen states.
45
James Madison was perhaps the most eloquent advocate for the separation of
powers that had been incorporated into the new Constitution. In an often-quoted
statement, he expressed this central principle that drove the delegates at the
Constitutional Convention:
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped
with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty .... The accumula-
tion of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the
cle of the American founding was precisely that they knew. Without electricity, without
computers and space flights, they knew. They wrote provisions so one person could not
dictate. They made certain America's future would not depend on whether 'the hand'
was decent or not. They had seen how quickly rulers become corrupted. They knew the
mortal danger of the evil pen.").
44. Statement of Thomas B. Griffith, supra note 14, at 55 ("There is no concept more
fundamental to the values protected by our constitutional system of government than the
separation of powers.... The Framers 'viewed the principle.., as the absolutely central
guarantee of a just government."' (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting))).
45. Senator Mike Crapo has stated:
In Federalist Paper 51, it is written, "If men were angels, no government would be
necessary." The writer knew, when promoting ratification of the Constitution in
1788, that our government would need controls to prevent the abuse of governmental
power. The Constitution does this by dividing the governmental power among three
equal branches with checks and balances to prevent each of them from gaining too
much power.
Press Release, Sen. Mike Crapo, supra note 28; see also Vazsonyi, supra note 2 (noting
the intent of the Founders to write constitutional provisions preventing any one official
from dictating on any single matter and theorizing that modern-day Americans do not
have the same wisdom displayed by the Founding Fathers); cf. Editorial, Restoring
Checks and Balances, INVESTOR's Bus. DAILY, Nov. 2, 1999, at A26 ("It doesn't take a
scholar to know that liberty is threatened when the power to make law is vested in a
single person. That's the type of authority wielded by Kings and dictators. Our sys-
tem-and a high degree of freedom-survives on tension between branches, not on the
actions of a wannabe king.").
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federal Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of
power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an
accumulation, no further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal
reprobation of the system.46
Madison went on to quote Montesquieu: "'There can be no liberty where
the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of
magistrates.' 47 After all, where this is so, "apprehensions may arise lest the
same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a ty-
rannical manner48
There is a seemingly endless supply of literature from the late 1700s af-
firming the importance placed on a division of powers by our Founding Fathers.
It was imperative, not only to the delegates at the Convention, but also to the
states ratifying the Constitution, that one branch of government be responsible
for creating the laws while another carry the responsibility for executing them.4 9
Separating these tasks was viewed as necessary to protect the "public security"
and to prevent arbitrary and tyrannical rule.50 Feelings ran especially high
against placement of legislative power in the hands of one-or even a few-
individuals.5 1 One of the fears expressed by those opposed to the Constitution
was that, despite ample provisions separating powers, these might still be insuf-
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1996).
47. Id. at 337-38 (quoting MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAwS (1748)).
48. Id. at 338.
49. id. at 336.
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 489 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1996). ("But these precautions [impeachment and other measures], great as
they are, are not the only ones which the plan of the convention has provided in favor of
the public security. In the only instances in which the abuse of the executive authority
was materially to be feared, the Chief Magistrate of the United States would, by that
plan, be subjected to the control of a branch of the legislative body."); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1996).
51. See, e.g., "Brutus," Brutus III, N.Y.J., Nov. 15, 1787, reprinted in 1 THEDEBATE
ON THE CONSTITUTION 317, 323 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993), available at
http://www.constitution.org/afp/brutus03.htm. One anti-Federalist, known as "Brutus"
alleged that a House of Representatives consisting of "only" sixty-five men was not
enough to "represent the feelings, opinions, and characters of a great multitude." Id. He
claimed that such representation was "merely nominal." Id. One can only imagine his
horror at laws made by a solitary executive. See also "Cato," Cato V, N.Y.J., Nov. 22,
1787, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra, at 394, 402. ("[T]he
representation consists of so few; too few to resist the influence of corruption, and the
temptation to treachery, against which all governments ought to take precautions.").
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ficient to prevent oppression.52 Without multiple safeguards, including separa-
tion of the power to legislate from the power to execute the laws, it was feared
that an avenue would be left open for a future government official to "behave
with all the violence of an oppressor."
53
There is a greater question than whether or not the Founders believed in a
separation of powers-clearly they did. The more important issue is, of course,
how did the Founders implement separation of powers in the newly created
American Constitution.54 The Founding Fathers faced a challenging task. They
needed to restrain the power of the federal government, but they also needed to
avoid fragmenting the government so completely that it would find itself ham-
pered and unable to act.55 They sought to separate the legislative, executive, and
judicial powers to prevent tyranny and abuse of power, but they also sought to
avoid isolating one branch so completely that there was no "check" on the au-
thority exercised by that branch.56
52. See, e.g., "Cato," Cato V, N.Y.J., Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 394, 399 ("I [have] endeavored to prove that the
language of the article relative to the establishment of the executive of this new govern-
ment was vague and inexplicit, that the great powers of the President, connected with his
duration in office would lead to oppression and ruin."). Professor McDonald notes the
anti-Federalists' fears that the presidency would essentially be a kingship. Their fears
probably resulted in part from a general fear of monarchy, but also from a belief that the
Vesting Clause granted too much power. McDONALD, supra note 36, at 192-93.
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 338 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1996) ("'Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty
of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the
legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the
violence of an oppressor.").
54. Some scholars argue that there was "no strong consensus" on what exactly a
"separation of powers" meant, although there was a strong consensus that such a system
was necessary to prevent tyranny. CASPER, supra note 40, at 21-22. Gerhard Casper
asserts that the Americans' belief in separation of powers was mingled with other,
contradictory notions of governmental power: "[It] did not mean that separation of
powers notions were absent before 1776. Rather, they were intertwined with older
notions reflecting the allocation of powers in the mixed colonial regimes." Id. at 11.
55. Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers for the Congressional Re-
search Service, states that the Framers "did not want a political system so fragmented in
structure, so divided in authority, that government could not function." Louis FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 10-11 (Prince-
ton Univ. Press 1985) (1978).
56. Madison noted that governmental powers were separate, but not wholly uncon-
nected. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 343 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1996) ("It was shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there ex-
amined does not require that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should
be wholly unconnected with each other."). The need for this state of affairs was noted
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The Framers knew that a lack of accountability would result in the destruc-
tion of liberties just as surely as a failure to separate powers sufficiently would
lead to tyranny. Justice Jackson articulated the balance needed in government
when he stated, "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure lib-
erty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interde-
pendence, autonomy but reciprocity. '57  Justice Joseph Story, a well-known
constitutional commentator, echoed this sentiment when he stated that a "rigid
adherence to [separation of powers] in all cases would be subversive of the effi-
ciency of the government, and result in the destruction of the public liberties."
58
To some degree, "blending" powers protects, and even strengthens, freedom
59
and endorsed by one of the anti-Federalists, "Brutus." He stated:
Perhaps no restraints are more forcible, than such as arise from responsibility to
some superior power. -Hence it is that the true policy of a republican government is,
to frame it in such manner, that all persons who are concerned in the government, are
made accountable to some superior for their conduct in office .... To have a govern-
ment well administered in all its parts, it is requisite [that] the different departments of
it should be separated and lodged as much as may be in different hands. The legisla-
tive power should be in one body, the executive in another, and the judicial in one dif-
ferent from either-But still each of these bodies should be accountable for their con-
duct.
"Brutus," Brutus XVI, Liberty Library of Constitutional Classics, Constitution Society
(Apr. 10, 1788), at http://www.constitution.org/afp/brutusl6.htm. Thomas Jefferson
endorsed such a governmental structure when speaking of the Virginia state assembly:
"For this reason, that convention which passed the ordinance of government, laid its
foundation on this basis, that the legislative, executive and judiciary departments
should be separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the powers of more
than one of them at the same time. But no barrier was provided between these sev-
eral powers."
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 345-46 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1996) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (1784)).
57. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
58. JOSEPH STORY, I COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
396 (5th ed. 1905), cited in FISHER, supra note 55, at 11.
59. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 343 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1996) ("[U]nless these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to
each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim
requires, as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.");
cf ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 127 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969) ("In everything important which [the President] does, he is di-
rectly or indirectly subject to the legislature; where he is entirely independent of it, he
can do almost nothing. It is therefore, his weakness, not his strength, which allows him
to carry on in opposition to the legislative power. In Europe there must be agreement
between king and chambers, because the fight between them might be serious. In Amer-
ica agreement is not obligatory because there such a fight is impossible.").
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Blending them too much, however, leads to tyrannical government. 60 Such was
the challenge that faced the delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
2. Delegation of Legislative Authority
The delegates answered the separation of powers challenge with a few
simple phrases. The Constitution grants power to the legislative and executive
branches by stating that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States,"6' and "[tihe executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America. 62 The language of the two
grants of power differs sharply. Article I adds the caveat "[a]ll legislative pow-
ers herein granted,"63 while the language of Article II is more similar to the
grant of judicial power in Article III: "[t]he executive Power shall be vested."'64
Not explicitly answered was the significance, if any, of the difference in phras-
ing. 65 For our purposes, the inquiry into this significance is limited to two ques-
tions. First, to what degree did the delegates intend the grant of legislative
power to be separated from the executive power? Second, to what degree did
60. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1996).
61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
62. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
63. Id. art. I, § 1.
64. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Article III states that "[t]he judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
65. McDONALD, supra note 36, at 181 (noting the different phrasing used to grant the
executive versus the legislative powers and asserting that the delegates did not indicate
the significance of the different wording). But see Hearing on Executive Orders, supra
note 33, at 8-10 (statement of Neil Kinkopf, Prof. of Law, Georgia State Univ.) (assert-
ing that the Founders intentionally left the boundaries between the legislative and execu-
tive powers undefined as they understood the nature of ambition and felt clear bounda-
ries would be futile; instead, they intended ambition to counteract ambition).
Professor Douglas Kmiec has instead focused on the Take Care Clause in determin-
ing the bounds of presidential power. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Expanding Executive
Power, in THE RULE OF LAW IN THE WAKE OF CLINTON 47, 47 (Roger Pilon ed., 2000).
Professor Kmiec notes the significance of the fact that discussion of presidential power
in the Constitution is "cast mostly in the language of duty." Id. ("'[T]he duty to execute
the laws "faithfully" means that American presidents may not.., refuse to honor and
enforce statutes that were enacted with their consent or over their veto."') (footnote
omitted) (second alteration in original).
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they intend the executive to participate in the lawmaking process in order to act
as a check on the legislative branch?
In evaluating the intent of the Framers as they created this new presidential
power, a focus could be placed on the traditional, broad notions of executive
power then existing. Perhaps the Americans assumed the existence of some of
these powers (including some lawmaking ability) in the executive they had just
created.66 However, other factors dispute the notion that the Framers assumed
the existence of large, unenumerated grants of power to the executive--
particularly legislative power. First, the executive power was only granted to
the President once many of the "traditional royal prerogatives" had been granted
to Congress. 67 The Founders did not want to incorporate traditional notions of a
"royal" executive into the Constitution; in fact, they sought to separate them-
selves from these notions. 68 Second, the colonists had been badly burned by a
monarchy with unchecked power once. It is unlikely that they would have sub-
jected themselves to such an executive authority again. 69 Last, the Founders
66. See, e.g., McDONALD, supra note 36, at 181 ("The more general vesting in Arti-
cle 2, combined with the specification of certain presidential functions and duties, pre-
supposes that 'executive power' had an agreed-upon meaning. Given the delegates'
knowledge of the subject from history, political philosophy, and experience, it seems
evident that some of them, at least, thought of executive power as contingent and discre-
tionary: the power to act unilaterally in circumstances in which the safety or the well
being of the republic is imperiled; power corresponding to that of ancient Roman dicta-
tors, or to Bracton's gubernaculum, or to Fortescue's dominium regale; power, in sum,
that extends beyond the ordinary rules prescribed by the Constitution and the laws.");
Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20
(1993) (noting the contention of some that any power understood to be in the executive
in 1789 and not reallocated to Congress remains in the executive).
67. See Monaghan, supra note 66, at 17 ("Not surprisingly, therefore, the most im-
portant datum-the Constitution itself--contains no hint of an independent presidential
regulatory power. The great powers of the national government are vested in Congress.
Some of the Crown's important powers-to create offices, to declare war-were trans-
ferred outright to Congress; other formerly important 'executive' powers, such as mak-
ing appointments and treaties, were shared with the Senate.").
68. Thomas Jefferson confirmed such a view when proposing a constitution for Vir-
ginia. He stated, "By executive powers, we mean no reference to those powers exer-
cised under our former government by the crown as of its prerogative.... We give them
those powers only, which are necessary to execute the laws and administer the govern-
ment, and which are not in their nature either legislative or judiciary." Id. at 15 (empha-
sis added).
69. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. In fact, when comparisons were
made of the President to the English King, the President was portrayed as a much
weaker figure. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 446-47 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1996) (comparing the English King, the American
President, and the New York governor); see also Eileen Burgin, Congress and Foreign
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repeatedly asserted the need for the people to protect themselves from the exer-
cise of unchecked legislative power by one, or even a few, individuals. 70
Taking these factors into consideration, the Founders solved the separation
of powers problem by giving the executive branch "partial agency," but not
"whole" control over the lawmaking power. 71 The executive's role in lawmak-
ing was to be restricted to the power to veto laws and to make policy recom-
mendations to Congress.72 There has perhaps always been a recognition that the
power to execute laws may necessarily imply some discretion on the part of the
President to "fill in the details" when implementing legislation; after all, statutes
are sometimes unclear or may convey some discretion in execution. 73 However,
Policy, The Misperceptions, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 334, 335 (Lawrence C. Dodd
& Bruce Oppenheimer ed., 5th ed., 1993) (recounting Hamilton's assertions that the
President would be much less powerful than the English King); DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 59, at 123 (comparing the King of France to the United States President).
70. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 344 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1996) ("In a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are
placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive department is very justly
regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for
liberty ought to inspire.").
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 338 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1996) ("[Montesquieul did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial
agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other.... [But] where the whole power of
one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of an-
other department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.").
72. See Sterling, supra note 30, at 108 (noting that the express language of the Con-
stitution authorizes Congress to make the laws, while no grant of lawmaking power is
given to the President except for the veto power). Support for this limitation on the
executive power can be found in the limited discussions on this subject in the debates at
the Constitutional Convention. One delegate suggested an amendment to Article II so
that it would read, "[the Executive has] power to carry into effect the national laws, to
appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers
'not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature,' as may from time to time be delegated by
the national Legislature." JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 39 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., Oxford Univ.
Press, 1920) (emphasis added). The proposal was rejected on the grounds that the limi-
tation, "not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature," was unnecessarily repetitive as the
Constitution did not allow the improper allocation of powers. James Madison argued
for the proposal, noting that although the addition was not necessary, it was not incon-
venient to add it either. Despite his efforts, the proposal did not pass. See id.; see also
Monaghan, supra note 66, at 16-17.
73. Hamilton saw the executive as performing largely an administrative, executive
function. In contrast, Jefferson, while maintaining that the executive had no legislative
or executive power, believed that the executive may be a "means to an end" when the
statute is unclear. See Monaghan, supra note 66, at 39. Similarly, President Taft sug-
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along with this recognition has come the understanding that the executive's role
is not to extend to actual lawmaking; he may not act where his actions cannot be
traced to a specific grant of power.74 President Taft characterized this as the
difference between presidential "discretion" and presidential "lawmaking." 75
The Founding Fathers recognized that a representative body of many indi-
viduals constituted the best mode of making laws.76 Any lawmaking by one
individual would immediately introduce the danger of tyranny. They instead
created a system that would not implement national policies until they had been
"the result of open and full debate, hammered out by the legislative and execu-
tive branches. 77 They deliberately took the lawmaking power out of the hands
of the executive and left him only with a veto power, knowing that, while such a
system may sometimes create inefficiencies, it would also create protection
from arbitrary rule.78 They determined that the executive could not have "di-
rect" or "complete" administration of the power of another branch, just as the
legislature and judiciary would not have complete control over the executive
power.
79
gested that the grant of executive power to the President includes the exercise of some
quasi-legislative functions; however, his view of presidential power remained much
more limited than more expansive modern notions. See TAFT, supra note 8, at 14.
74. But see Monaghan, supra note 66, at 2 (noting the contention of some that a more
pragmatic approach should be taken to our understanding of presidential power and that
the President should be granted more lawmaking authority in some circumstances).
75. Id. at 40; see also, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, In Search of Purloined Powers, WASH.
TIMES, July 31, 2000, at A20 (contrasting the assertion that presidents are not supposed
to legislate with the reality that statutes sometimes convey some discretion to the Presi-
dent).
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 344 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1996) (endorsing placement of the legislative power solely in a representative, numerous
assembly). But see Statement of Thomas 0. Sargentich, supra note 33, at 31 (asserting
that a claim that the President has no "lawmaking" power is overstated and that such an
interpretation would result in an "unworkably rigid" distinction between lawmaking and
executing the laws).
77. Testimony of Hon. Jack Metcalf, supra note 3, at 13 ("The Framers expected na-
tional policy to be the result of open and full debate, hammered out by the legislative
and executive branches. They believed in careful delineation conducted in a representa-
tive assembly, subject to all the checks and balances that characterize our constitutional
system.").
78. See Burgin, supra note 69, at 334 (noting that the Framers sacrificed efficiency
where needed to thwart the potential for abuse of power by ambitious government offi-
cials).
79. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 343 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1996) (noting that no department should have "overruling influence over the others, in
the administration of their respective powers").
[Vol. 28
President or King? Executive Orders
Allowing the President to make laws and set national policy through the
use of executive orders or other presidential directives directly contradicts the
intent of the Framers.8° Not only does it subvert the system of checks and bal-
ances carefully crafted by our Founding Fathers, but it also gives the President
"direct" and "complete" control over the legislative power of Congress-
creating a situation fraught with exactly that type of danger that the Framers
sought to avoid. Justice Jackson once stated, "With all its defects, delays and
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free
government except that the Executive be under the law, and the law be made by
parliamentary deliberations." 81 Any use of executive authority to the contrary
subverts this purpose.
C. Uses of Executive Orders Through the Years
Historically speaking, executive orders have always been considered an in-
dispensable tool of the executive. Over time, however, the manner in which
these orders are used has changed drastically. In the first years of our republic,
executive orders were used primarily to regulate government employees, to
transfer property among governmental departments or to establish national holi-
days or days of mourning.82 Today, the use has expanded so drastically that
80. Such an argument does not undermine the theory that the Framers intended to
create a strong, unitary, "energetic" executive. The Founders, in fact, argued for an
executive with sufficient strength to act as a check on the legislature while they were
simultaneously taking legislative power out of his hands. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 70,
at 451 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1996) ("A feeble Execu-
tive implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another
phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory,
must be, in practice, a bad government."); see also Steven G. Calabresi, Some Norma-
tive Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REv. 23 (1995). The Founders
protected the strength of the executive, not by giving him lawmaking ability, but by
giving him other characteristics. For instance, the President is unitary, not plural. While
the Senate may refuse to confirm some of his appointments, the President takes the ini-
tiative in proposing these officers, ambassadors, and judges. Neither the Senate nor the
House can force the President to act or otherwise share the executive power. He has a
four-year term that can only be ended through the difficult process of impeachment, and
he has a veto power that may only be overcome by a two-thirds vote of the legislature.
DETOCQUEVILLE, supra note 59, at 121-122.
81. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 658 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
82. Statement of Hon. Bob Barr, supra note 35, at 8; OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11,
at 8; Sterling, supra note 30, at 101. Such a use is consistent with checks and balances,
as these functions are merely administrative in nature. See id. at 102.
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executive orders and other directives may now even be used to create and im-
pose legal burdens on private citizens.8 3
Some have hypothesized that this growth in the scope of executive power
has occurred due to the increase in size of the administrative state or because the
nature of the country's economy has changed." While these factors doubtless
have an impact, this article argues that the growth of executive power stems
from one primary problem. Legislative representatives-and their constitu-
ents-have failed to hold presidents accountable for their ever-increasing use of
executive power. In fact, they have done just the opposite. Citizens have asked
presidents to skirt the legislative process to issue executive orders on their be-
half.85 Some in Congress have been only too happy to sit back and watch as the
President facilitates the promulgation of policy that would be difficult to get
through Congress.86 The longer this state of affairs is allowed to continue, the
83. Sterling, supra note 30, at 100.
84. E.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 568-69 (1973)
(claiming that expanded economic forces, the growth in population and business, in-
creased interdependence among states, and a rising demand on government have con-
tributed to the growth in presidential power); Sterling, supra note 30, at 100-01 (hy-
pothesizing that a turning point was reached in America as the country moved from a
period in which exploration of the continent was the primary activity to a period in
which the primary goal of government was to regulate natural resources). But see Sam-
uel P. Huntington, Congressional Responses to the Twentieth Century, in CLASSIC
READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 38, at 270 (arguing that Congress has not
appropriately adjusted to the twentieth century and has not been able to play a leadership
role in determining the direction of public policy initiatives); MCDONALD, supra note
36, at 347 (noting decreasing involvement of congressmen as the volume of legislation
has grown).
85. E.g., Peter Cleary, Editorial, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Feb. 2, 2000, at Al (re-
porting a request of the Institute for Women's Policy Research to President Clinton for
an executive order implementing policies similar to those in the Paycheck Fairness Act
pending before Congress); see also, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 66, at 8 (noting that
Americans seem to turn to the government for a solution to virtually every problem).
The mentality of American citizens has changed over time. The country has moved
from a time when individuals expected to take personal responsibility for their well-
being to a time in which, instead, the government is expected to take responsibility.
Sterling, supra note 30, at 100-01 (theorizing that the government has become more
socialist since the time of the Civil War and that Americans place "their confidence and
hope in a 'benevolent' government" who may be able to "allev[e] their economic
woes"). This state of affairs seems to be worsening as America, for the first time in
decades, enters a state of war.
86. E.g., Hearing on H.R. 3131, supra note 3, at 39 (statement of Hon. Ron Paul,
Rep. of Cong., State of Texas) [hereinafter Statement of Hon. Ron Paul] ("It is, of
course, a mistake to place all blame with any single president or the presidency itself for
abuse of this power. After all, presidents have had many willing accomplices in Con-
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harder it will be to curb the abusive excesses of executive power by future
presidents.8 7
1. Washington to Lincoln
President Washington, of course, set the initial precedent for the use of ex-
ecutive authority. Washington used his powers very conservatively, recognizing
not only that the federal government had limited power, but also that he himself
was limited by separation of powers. He did not take any action to "'achieve by
executive order any matter which the strictest interpretation of the Constitution
could regard as within the legislative domain." 88
The first order issued by Washington was one that ordered the acting offi-
cers of the Confederation government to prepare a report for the new govern-
ment regarding the state of affairs in America 89 He later issued orders and
proclamations in response to requests by Congress. For instance, he issued a
proclamation declaring October 3, 1789, to be a day of Thanksgiving after Con-
gress had requested that he choose a date for this purpose.90 In 1794 and there-
after, Congress often authorized Washington to impose or lift embargoes, which
he did.9'
The most controversial order issued by Washington was his so-called "neu-
trality order." The order was issued on April 22, 1793, and proclaimed the neu-
trality of the United States in the war between England and France.92 Washing-
ton saw the order as a statement regarding the existing state of affairs, not an act
that would bind Congress. 93 Others argued that the order did more than Wash-
ington claimed, that it cited no authority, and that it was not a valid exercise of
gress. A great number of congressmen and senators quietly appreciate the assumed
presidential authority to create and enact legislation because it allows them to see their
goals accomplished without having to assume political responsibility.").
87. Cf. Statement of Hon. Bob Barr, supra note 35, at 9 ("President Clinton is simply
expanding a precedent for setting policy by executive order that has been established in
previous Administrations.").
88. Monaghan, supra note 66, at 18 (quoting JAMES T. FLEXNER, GEORGE
WASHINGTON AND THE NEW NATION 221 (1969)).
89. See OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 11.
90.1d.
91. See Monaghan, supra note 66, at 19. Although many thought that this might be
an unconstitutional delegation of authority, none suggested that Washington should have
had the authority to independently impose or lift embargoes. Id.
92. Statement of Thomas B. Griffith, supra note 14, at 55; OLSON & WOLL, supra
note 11, at 11.
93. STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 16.
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executive authority. 94 Washington had difficulty enforcing the order until Con-
gress stepped in and issued the Neutrality Act of 1794.95 However, dispute over
this executive order was a relatively minor bump in the road as precedent for the
use of presidential power was established. Presidents following Washington
continued to conservatively use executive orders. President Lincoln was the
first to drastically broaden the scope of executive power.%
Lincoln, admittedly, governed in unusual times. The country was rapidly
approaching a state of Civil War. When the war started, Congress was not in
session, and Lincoln fought the war for three months through executive order
before calling an emergency session of Congress and seeking retroactive ap-
proval for the actions he had taken.97 Congress allowed him to circumvent its
authority, despite the fact that Lincoln could have called the special session
sooner to allow legislative participation in the war. Congress was apparently
reacting to a concern that refusing to ratify Lincoln's orders might place Ameri-
can military forces at risk.98
Through his broad use of the executive power, Lincoln took such actions as
calling forth the militia,99 blockading southern ports,'0° building warships, fund-
ing requisitions,101 and suspending the writ of habeas corpus.'02 Lincoln saw the
94. Id. Hamilton saw the order as a grant of power authorized by Article II. Madi-
son, however, argued that the American government was not a government of royal
prerogatives and that the order was unconstitutional. Id.
95. Statement of Thomas B. Griffith, supra note 14, at 55.
96. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that 143 executive orders were is-
sued from the time of Washington to Buchanan, but that the practice changed when
Lincoln took office); Sterling, supra note 30, at 105 (discussing the change in the use of
executive power at the time of Lincoln).
97. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that war was fought for nearly three
months without congressional approval); see also Sterling, supra note 30, at 105.
98. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 14 (discussing congressional approval of Lin-
coln's actions after the war had already begun); Sterling, supra note 30, at 105 (noting
the Supreme Court's deferential attitude towards Lincoln's action, given the extreme
circumstances under which he was operating).
99. McDONALD, supra note 36, at 356 (discussing the steps taken by Lincoln follow-
ing the firing on Fort Sumter); OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 12 (delineating actions
taken by Lincoln beginning in April 1861).
100. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 12; Sterling, supra note 30, at 105.
101. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 12.
102. STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 21. President Lincoln issued
instructions to General Scott, ordering him to suppress insurrections and to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus "'in the extremest necessity."' Id. (quoting Order from Abraham
Lincoln to Lieutenant-General Scott (April 25, 1861), in 7 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS 3218-19 (Bureau of National Literature, Inc., New York, James D.
Richardson ed., 1897)). The result was a struggle for power between the courts and the
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dangers that the Founding Fathers had sought to avert by placing legislative
powers in Congress, but he nevertheless used his role as Commander in Chief to
justify an enlargement of the executive power. While times were certainly ex-
treme and could be argued to justify equally extreme action, the danger that the
Founders saw also came to pass-future generations of presidents later used his
actions as a precedent for their own usurpation of legislative power. 03 A con-
gressional study on executive orders later summed up this era by stating, "Presi-
dent Lincoln and other Presidents have used this military office bestowed upon
them by the Constitution to enlarge the powers of the Presidency, although with
good faith and with noble motives, with greater impact upon the civilian popula-
tion and our constitutional system than upon the military forces."' 4 President
Bush should remember the ramifications of Lincoln's well-intentioned orders as
he issues his own directives during this time of war. Balancing his responsibil-
ity to act and protect the country against the need to set a good precedent for
future presidents will be one of the more difficult challenges facing President
Bush in the upcoming years.
2. Roosevelt to Wilson
After the Civil War ended and Lincoln was assassinated, Presidents tempo-
rarily returned to the former, more conservative use of executive power-until
President Theodore Roosevelt was elected to office.105 President Roosevelt held
to a significantly broader theory of the executive power than had his predeces-
President. When Chief Justice Taney of the U.S. Circuit in Baltimore issued a writ of
habeas corpus for John Merryman, General Cadwalader, in command at Fort McHenry
where Merryman was being held, returned the writ, claiming that it could not be served
under order of the President. Id. at 21-22. The Chief Justice ordered that a writ of at-
tachment be served on General Cadwalader, but it was returned to him, unserved, when
the marshal was not allowed in the gate at Fort McHenry. Id. at 22. Although the Chief
Justice's opinion was later affirmed by the Supreme Court, the affirmation came too
late. Lincoln ignored the Chief Justice's demands, although he later referred to the mat-
ter in an appearance before Congress. Lincoln's actions were legalized two years later
in the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863. Id. at 23.
103. Id. at 20.
104. Id.; cf. William Norman Grigg, Our Elected Dictator, The New American, at
http://www.thenewamerican.contna/2000/02-14-2000/vol6noO4_dictator.htm (noting
that promiscuous uses of presidential power are hard to rein in due to the "collection of
precedents" to which presidents can turn to justify their usurpation of legislative power).
105. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 12. At 1006 orders, President Roosevelt is-
sued more executive orders than all but three Presidents: Woodrow Wilson, Calvin Coo-
lidge, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. See id. at 13 tbl. 1. President Roosevelt is said to
be one of the primary instigators of the more modern, expansive use of executive power.
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sors. He believed that he could take any action necessary for the good of the
nation and asserted that he was "'limited only by specific restrictions and prohi-
bitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by Congress under its constitu-
tional powers.""
6
Roosevelt governed in an era when the government was beginning to get
involved in solving social problems 107 He would urge reform in an area; if re-
form did not come, then he took responsibility for reform implemented by other
legislation. Historian Forrest McDonald described this aspect of Roosevelt's
presidency: "Roosevelt's showmanship in pretending to be the fountain of re-
form legislation transformed the expectations Americans had for their presidents
and thus opened the door for the emergence of the legislative presidency.
108
Roosevelt's massive use of the executive order includes those for which he may
best be remembered: his orders setting aside land as national monuments.°9
When President Taft entered office following Roosevelt, use of executive
orders decreased, but only partially. In contrast to Roosevelt's views, Taft
viewed the executive power as one that must be "fairly and reasonably traced to
some specific grant of power."110 Although Taft's views of the presidency were
less broad than Roosevelt's views, he nevertheless used executive orders more
broadly than Roosevelt's predecessors had. He unilaterally altered terms of trea-
ties with several Indian tribes,"' and he issued 698 executive orders total-
almost as many as Presidents Carter and Reagan combined.1
2
Following Taft, Woodrow Wilson's use of executive orders demonstrated,
again, a drastic increase. Like Lincoln, Wilson at least had the excuse of a war
to justify his actions. Prior to World War I, Wilson declared a national emer-
gency two months before Congress had declared war.11 3 He created federal
agencies, including the World Trade Board, the Grain Corporation Committee
on Public Information, and the Food Administration." 4 He restricted radio us-
106. TAFT, supra note 8, at 143 (quoting ROOSEVELT, supra note 8); see also OLSON
& WOLL, supra note 11, at 15 (noting Roosevelt's aggressive use of executive orders
and his theory on executive power).
107. MCDONALD, supra note 36, at 358.
108. Id.
109. Sterling, supra note 30, at 102 (describing Roosevelt's use of the executive or-
der to set aside land).
110. TAFT, supra note 8, at 139.
111. See Sterling, supra note 30, at 103 (describing Taft's use of executive orders).
112. In contrast to Taft's 698 executive orders, Carter issued 320 and Reagan issued
381. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 13 tbl.1.
113. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 15 (describing Wilson's presidency and his
declaration of a national emergency on February 5, 1917); Sterling, supra note 30, at
103 (describing the widened use of executive orders by Wilson).
114. STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 36 (listing new agencies cre-
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age," 5 and he regulated the price of coal." 6 In sum, he issued 1791 executive
orders before he left office.' "
In describing his view of the presidency, Wilson compared the office to a
"prime minister," stating that the President must be "as much concerned with
the guidance of legislation as with the just and orderly execution of law... he is
the spokesman of the Nation in everything."'" 8 In writing on the presidency
after his term of office, Wilson differentiated between constitutional "theory"
and the "realities of governmental power.""19 Despite his expansive views of
the presidency, Wilson did show some degree of deference to Congress, and he,
at least nominally, handed his newly acquired powers back to Congress follow-
ing the war.' 2° Most wartime measures taken by Wilson were repealed on
March 3, 1921, shortly before President Harding was inaugurated. 121
3. FDR and the New Deal
The next President to have a major impact on the scope of presidential
power was Franklin Delano Roosevelt ("FDR"), who was elected during the
midst of the Great Depression. The best expression of FDR's approach toward
executive power came in his own words during his first inaugural address. He
stated that
ated by Wilson); see also Sterling, supra note 30, at 103.
115. Sterling, supra note 30, at 103.
116. Id.
117. OLSON & WoLL, supra note 11, at 13 tbl.1.
118. ARTHUR S. LINK, WOODROW WILSON: THE NEW FREEDOM 147 (1956), cited in
MCDONALD, supra note 36, at 359. Wilson further stated that Congress is "the law
making part of the government" and should "be very hospitable to the suggestions of the
planning and acting part of it, the presidency." Id., cited in MCDONALD, supra note 36,
at 359. In his book, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT, Wilson described Congress as the
"sovereign authority" in "central government" that is "constantly becoming stronger and
more active." Editor's Preface to Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, in
CLASSIC READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 38, at 259, 259. However, his
views had changed to such a degree by 1908 that he called the presidency "dominant
over Congress" in his book CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. Id.;
see also Monaghan, supra note 66, at 1-2 (describing Wilson's evolving theory of the
presidency).
119. WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 70
(1908), cited in Monaghan, supra note 66, at 2. Wilson also stated that "[t]he President
is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can." Id., cited in
Monaghan, supra note 66, at 2.
120. Sterling, supra note 30, at 104 (noting that although Wilson handed his powers
back to Congress, the programs he had created did not die).
121. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 15.
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the normal balance of Executive and legislative authority may [not] be
wholly adequate to meet the unprecedented task before us.
[Uinprecedented demand and need for undelayed action may call for tempo-
rary departure from that normal balance of public procedure.
[I]n the event that Congress shall fail to take one of these two
courses, and in the event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall
not evade the clear course of duty that will then confront me.
122
FDR was true to his word. He used his executive authority to issue 3723
executive orders, more than twice as many as Woodrow Wilson had issued dur-
ing World War I.23 The executive power was used to authorize a wide range of
activities, including creation of the National Labor Board and the War Labor
Board,' 24 implementation of the National Industrial Recovery Act,' 25 moving the
country off the gold standard, 126 expanding the Trading with the Enemy Act,' 27
establishment of a bank holiday,' 28 relocation of Japanese-American citizens, 29
and other actions applicable to labor relations and private business.'30 Congress
was a willing accomplice in this effort by the President.
31
122. First Inaugural Address of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in WAR AND
EMERGENCY POWERS 58 (Paul Bailey ed., 1994), cited in OLSON & WOLL, supra note
11, at 15-16.
123. See OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 13 tbl. 1. The 1957 congressional study
states that "[tihe peak year ... [for executive orders was] 1933, the first year of the New
Deal, when the power of the President was expanded to an unprecedented degree to cope
with the depression." STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 36.
124. STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 36.
125. Id.
126. Sterling, supra note 30, at 105.
127. Id.
128. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 16 (delineating FDR's actions that were un-
dertaken in an effort to spur economic recovery).
129. Id.; see also Jena Heath, Congressmen Want to Curb Presidential Executive Or-
ders, Cox NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 29, 1999 (discussing controversial executive orders,
including FDR's executive order deciding that Japanese-Americans were "national secu-
rity risks" during World War II).
130. Id.; Sterling, supra note 30, at 105 ("'During the first 100 days in office, [FDR]
seized all gold and silver, took the country off the gold standard and established a bank-
ing system based on the debts of the people, expanded the Trading With the Enemy Act
to redefine "enemy" as including all the American people, establish government control
over natural resources, the social agenda and welfare, utilities, private financing, indus-
try, labor and transportation, and bailed out the banks. Roosevelt's acts abrogated the
gold clause in all public and private contracts, thus usurping the legality of private con-
tracts. At the same time he established control over financing and the price of homes,
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FDR justified his actions based on the actions of those that had gone before
him Of Woodrow Wilson, he stated, "'All one has to do is to go back and read
those war acts which conferred upon the Executive far greater power over hu-
man beings and over property than anything that was done in 1933. ' 132 Just as
Lincoln's actions during the Civil War eventually gave his successors "permis-
sion" to more freely exercise executive power, it appears that Wilson's actions
did the same for his successors. Herein lies the danger in allowing aberrations
from the constitutional structure, even in emergencies. What' was an emergency
action in one generation will become permissible-even ordinary-in the next.
4. Truman and Beyond
President Truman was the first President to operate under this post-New
Deal conception of the executive power. With 905 executive orders, he issued
far fewer executive orders than did FDR, but still far more than any President
prior to Theodore Roosevelt.13 3 Truman's view of the executive power main-
tained the expansive, broad notion of the presidency that FDR had endorsed:
When the founding fathers outlined the Presidency in Article 1 of the
Constitution, they left a great many details out and vague. I think they relied
on the experience of the nation to fill in the outlines. The office of the chief
executive has grown with the progress of the great republic. It has responded
to the many demands that our complex society has made upon the Govern-
ment.... [Tloday our government cannot function properly unless the Presi-
dent is master in his own house and unless the executive departments and
and inserted into the Agricultural Adjustment Act a clause which shifted the power to
coin money and regulate its value (granted by the constitution to congress) from con-
gress to the president."' (quoting EUGENE SCHRODER, CONSTrruTION: FACT OR FICTION
25 (1995))) (alteration in original).131. This era was marked not just by an unusually high number of executive orders,
but also by total cooperation between Congress and the President. Nelson W. Polsby,
Some Landmarks in Modem Presidential-Congressional Relations, in BOTH ENDS OF
THE AVENUE 2 (Anthony King ed., 1983) ("[T]he divisiveness and the normal politics of
sectional interest that had dominated Congress over the previous period gave way to a
depression-induced cooperation between president and Congress that had not been seen
for a generation. President Roosevelt proposed various measures, and Congress enacted
them very speedily indeed.").
132. Sterling, supra note 30, at 105 (quoting 4 RooSEVELT PAPERS 205-06).
133. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 13 tbl.1. All Presidents since Truman have
issued fewer than 500 executive orders. Id. Of these modern-day Presidents, only Ei-
senhower has issued more than 400 executive orders. He issued 452. Id. Clinton issued
364 executive orders before leaving office.
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agencies of the government, including the armed forces, are responsible only
to the President.134
Truman issued the first executive order to be overturned in its entirety
when he seized control of most of the country's steel mills to prevent a threat-
ened steelworkers' strike. 135 Not until the administration of President Clinton
was another executive order again overturned in its entirety. 36 These cases are
discussed in greater detail below.
Presidents since the time of Truman have generally maintained an expan-
sive view of presidential power and have used this power to implement policy,
even when the orders have been somewhat controversial. For instance, Eisen-
hower issued 452 executive orders.137 Kennedy used executive orders to estab-
lish many federal agencies and to prohibit racial discrimination in federally sub-
sidized housing. 138 Johnson and Nixon used executive orders to wage the war in
Vietnam. 139 Nixon ordered the FBI to spy on Americans not agreeing with the
war, but Ford later revoked the order.140 Carter used an executive order to create
134. SCHRODER, supra note 130, at 95-96, cited in Sterling, supra note 30, at 106.
135. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952). The dis-
pute in the case centered around a labor dispute between the steel companies and their
employees, who could not agree on wages despite recommendations by the Federal
Wage Stabilization Board. Id. at 582-83. President Truman issued Executive Order
10,340, directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of the steel mills and
keep them running. The President cited national defense concerns as justification for his
action. Id. at 583.
136. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996). At least two
other challenges to executive orders have been made since Chamber of Commerce. The
first was a challenge to a Clinton order designating a national monument in Utah. The
case is still pending. See discussion infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text. The
second was to an executive order of Bush U's prohibiting the use of project labor
agreements on federally funded construction projects. President Bush's order was over-
turned in its entirety by a district court in November 2001. An appeal is pending. See
discussion infra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
137. John A. Sterling, Above the Law: Evolution of Executive Orders (Part Two),
UWLA. L. REv. 123, 123-24 (2000) (discussing executive orders from the time of Ei-
senhower to the present).
138. Id. at 124; see also Heath, supra note 129 (discussing executive orders issued by
President Kennedy in regards to federally subsidized housing). Kennedy also estab-
lished the Peace Corps, the President's Commission on Equal Employment, the Com-
mission on the Status of Women, and the President's Council on Aging, among other
agencies. Sterling, supra note 137, at 124.
139. Sterling, supra note 137, at 124.
140. Heath, supra note 129.
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the Federal Emergency Management Agency.141 Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and
Bush II have each issued controversial orders on subjects ranging from labor
relations disputes to abortions. 42 The war on terrorism has led to still more
controversial orders.
Broad use of executive orders became so prevalent in the second half of the
1900s that a special Senate Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated
Emergency Powers was authorized to investigate the matter in 1974. 43 The
committee made several findings, including the fact that the United States had
been governed under emergency rule since FDR called a state of emergency in
1933.'" Upon completion of the study, committee co-chairman Senator Frank
Church of Idaho stated, "Presidents could manage every aspect of the lives of all
American citizens."' 45 The study resulted in legislation that ended all then exist-
ing states of emergency. The legislation also gave Congress the ability to termi-
nate any future states of emergency by joint resolution.146 The cure was tempo-
rary. Thirteen states of emergency were still in effect in late 1999.' 47 In addi-
tion, the legislation allowing termination of emergencies by Congress has never
been used.'4
The most significant trend in the use of executive orders over the years has
been the change in the tenor of the orders. 49 Whereas Washington worked dili-
141. Sterling, supra note 137, at 124.
142. See discussion infra note 173 and accompanying text.
143. Edwards, supra note 2, at 18.
144. Id. The study also identified 500 laws that go into effect when a state of emer-
gency is called. These laws give the President many powers, including, but not limited
to: the power to seize property, commodities, fuels and minerals; the power to assign
military abroad; the power to declare martial law; and the,power to restrict travel.
Murray, supra note 1.
145. Edwards, supra note 2, at 18. He also stated, "It is distressingly clear that our
constitutional government has been weakened by 41 years of emergency rule." Id.
146. Id.; Murray, supra note 1.
147. Murray, supra note 1 (noting that thirteen states of emergency are in effect, in-
cluding two called by President Carter and two by President George H.W. Bush). After
the 1974 National Emergencies Act sunsetted all then-existing emergencies, President
Carter called the next emergency in 1979 during the Iran hostage crisis. Id.
148. Edwards, supra note 2, at 18 (stating that no emergency has ever been termi-
nated by joint resolution under the National Emergencies Act).
149. Todd Gaziano of the Heritage Foundation has remarked:
A comparison based on numbers, however, is misleading. It is not the number, but
the nature of a President's executive orders that is important.... [T]he overwhelming
majority of directives, including executive orders, are routine and few have signifi-
cant policy implications beyond the executive branch. It would be a mistake, there-
fore, to conclude that the number of executive orders or proclamations is a reliable
indicator of whether a particular President has abused his executive order authority...
The true measure of abuse of authority is not the overall number of directives, but
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gently to avoid issuing any order that would constitute more than an administra-
tive order to those in the government, presidents since then have used orders to
create agencies, promulgate racial policies and seize private property. This trend
has created a dangerous new problem that must be addressed by Congress be-
fore it escalates out of control.
ER. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
One of the most important developments in the twentieth century has been
the growth of presidential power. 150 As the power of the federal government has
grown, the power of the President has increased exponentially along with it to
such a point that he is now often called "the most powerful man in the world."'
51
The President's power has grown to such an extent that he might now be
called the "Chief Lawmaker," exercising legislative power in violation of the
Constitution. In recent decades, presidents have taken the initiative to set pol-
icy--even when Congress has opposed the policy or refused to address a par-
ticular area.152 This is not a violation committed by one president or one politi-
cal party. All have done it.
15 3
whether any orders were illegal or abusive, and if so, how many and of what signifi-
cance.
Todd F. Gaziano, The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders and Other Presidential
Directives, 5 TEx. REv. LAW & POL. 267, 296-97 (2001).
150. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 84, at 567-68 ("[The twentieth century] has
been an age of central, national power.... The main beneficiary of power at the center
was not the national Congress, not the Supreme Court, but the national President.");
Bartlett, supra note 75 ("One of the most important developments of the modem presi-
dency is the growth of presidential lawmaking by executive order."). But see Ramesh
Ponnuru, Trivial Pursuits, NAT'L REv., Nov. 20, 2000, at 16, 18 ("It is tempting to sug-
gest that this is in fact Clinton's real legacy: the trivialization of the presidency, of the
government, of politics. The presidency may have grown more powerful by some
measures: the independent-counsel law is dead, and it has become more acceptable to
govern through executive order and regulatory fiat. But the presidency has never had
less respect. Washington has never seemed more irrelevant.... Politics is now a specta-
tor sport, which is to say a television show.").
151. FRIEDMAN, supra note 84, at 568 ('The man who holds this office has become,
as Presidents like to think, the most important, the most powerful man in the world.
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson already sensed this role; Franklin Roosevelt
glorified in it; Harding and Coolidge, small men with weak conceptions of their job,
were only detours on the way. Weak Presidents are still possible, but a weak Presidency
is not.").
152. See discussion infra Part HI.A.
153. E.g., Hearing on Executive Orders, supra note 33, at 4 (testimony of Hon. Por-
ter J. Goss, Rep. of Congress, State of Florida).
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The question to be addressed is not whether these policies are good or bad;
there are doubtless some of each. The real question revolves around what dam-
age is done to the country and to our democratic system when presidents can
unilaterally make policy-any policy-without the consent of Congress.'5
What possible justification is there for the implementation of laws without re-
gard to the normal legislative process? In short, there is no justification and no
emergency so great that it requires that Congress be completely disregarded.155
President Taft once cautioned against exactly this situation when he warned that
allowing the President to have an "undefined residuum of power" would allow
him to become a "Universal Providence" setting "all things right."'51 6 The field
of action of such an executive could not be limited. While some might use the
power faithfully, others might become tyrants. The best way to protect our-
selves from arbitrary and tyrannical rule is to demand that our officials remain
true to the democratic legislative process outlined in the Constitution.
154. Statement of Phillip Cooper, supra note 16, at 52 ("To adopt the view that the
president should do whatever he or she thinks necessary to accomplish what may very
well be laudable goals is to embrace quite literally the philosophy that the ends justify
the means. In a constitutional republic designed to endure under the rule of law through
carefully designed procedures and institutions, such an idea is repugnant.").
155. Hearing on H.R. 3131, supra note 3, at 30 (statement of Hon. Jack Metcalf) ("If
Congress is required to follow this rigorous process, how absurd it is to argue that a
president can accomplish the same result by unilaterally issuing an executive order or
proclamation."); see also Labbe, supra note 2, at B9 ("What kind of issues are so press-
ing that a president feels compelled to make law via executive order-or worse yet,
through classified presidential directives that even members of Congress are denied
access to-rather than go through the constitutionally mandated process of congres-
sional approval?"). Certainly, extraordinary circumstances may exist when the country
is attacked, as was seen in the days following September 11, 2001. These circum-
stances, however, do not put the Constitution "on hold" for the duration of the crisis.
Separation of powers must still exist to protect liberty; otherwise, the President could
simply declare war or claim the existence of a crisis as an excuse to act at will without
"interference" from Congress. Both Congress and the President have their appropriate
areas of responsibility, even when the country is at war. For example, Congress, not the
President, has the power to declare war. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. Similarly, the Founders
granted the President power to act as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. See
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Different considerations may exist and certainly need to
be accommodated in the area of foreign policy; however, the concerns of the Founders
are not negated simply because the country is at war or under attack. This area of presi-
dential power is clearly more complicated than the President's power in the domestic
arena, particularly as the Constitution gives the President more independent authority in
the foreign policy realm than in the domestic. A detailed analysis of the President's
power in the realm of foreign policy, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
156. TAFr, supra note 8, at 144.
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A. Presidential Lawmaking
President Taft once stated, "The truth is that great as his powers are, when
a President comes to exercise them, he is much more concerned with the limita-
tions upon them than he is affected, like little Jack Homer, by a personal joy
over the big personal things he can do."'157 This was arguably once true. In re-
cent years, however, as the power of the presidency has grown, presidents have
seemingly fallen prey to the dangers of possessing too much power, as our
Founders once warned against.158 No longer are many presidents focused on the
limitations to their power. Instead, they use their power as expansively as pos-
sible to impose their policy decisions single-handedly upon the nation.'5 9
Executive orders that were once issued based on specific statutory or con-
stitutional grants of power are now issued based on sweeping claims of author-
ity.' 6 ' For instance, one informal count of Clinton's executive orders showed
that nearly one-third of his orders relied on no statutory grant of authority what-
soever.'6' Although the basis for presidential action is sometimes unclear, these
actions nevertheless often go unchallenged.
Most modern presidents have used their powers more expansively than the
Founders intended. However, only in the past few decades have such expansive
powers been used in the absence of a true emergency. 62 President Clinton per-
157. id. at 49.
158. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Susan Feeney, Optimism Fading for Political Rapport: Parties Back-
ing off Vows of Cooperation, Experts Say, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 12, 1994, at
IA ("As a backstop, White House officials are exploring ways for the president to make
a mark beyond the reach of Congress, such as through executive orders, law enforce-
ment, regulations or foreign policy.").
160. Executive orders may cite authority in such a vague, sweeping fashion as: "By
virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States
and as President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the United States." STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 39. Such a state-
ment is generally used when there is no statutory authority, and it serves as a catch-all.
Id.; see also Statement of Phillip Cooper, supra note 16, at 50 ("First, there has been an
increasing tendency since the 1970s for presidents to make sweeping claims of constitu-
tional authority as the basis for their directives. In some cases in which references are
made to statutes, they are very general in nature and implicate relatively ambiguous
legislative provisions. It becomes difficult to hold officials accountable when the pre-
cise basis for their actions is unclear.").
161. Kmiec, supra note 65, at 49.
162. FDR believed that his expansive powers would revert to the people once the war
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haps used his powers more expansively than any president to date. 163 It is a
well-documented fact that the Clinton administration perceived executive orders
as a legitimate means to press its own agenda. 164 President Clinton himself once
stated:
Congress has a choice to make in writing this chapter of our history. It
can choose partisanship, or it can choose progress. Congress must decide...
. I have a continuing obligation to act, to use the authority of the presidency
and the persuasive power of the podium to advance America's interest at
home and abroad. 165
The Clinton administration used the executive order as a tool to circumvent
an "intransigent" Congress and implement policy single-handedly.'6 For in-
and economic emergencies had passed. Monaghan, supra note 66, at 30 ("The Ameri-
can people can be sure that I will use my powers with a full sense of my responsibility to
the Constitution and to my country.... When the war is won, the powers under which 1
act automatically revert to the people-to whom they belong.") (emphasis added).
163. E.g., Murray, supra note 1 (quoting Paul Begala, who described Clinton as "an
activist, muscular president"); Grigg, supra note 104 ("President Clinton has wielded his
executive power with abandon, threatening to destroy the very delicate checks and bal-
ances of our constitutional system."); cf. James Hirsen, Executive Orders and the Presi-
dential Campaign, Newsmax.com, at http://www.newsmax.comlcommentmax/articles/
Dr._James_Hirsen.shtml (Oct. 27, 2000) (alleging that the worst "scar" of the Clinton
presidency may be the "blatant misuse" of executive orders). Clinton challenged Bush I
during the 1992 presidential election, stating, "If you won't use the powers of the presi-
dency to help people, step aside. I will." Murray, supra note 1.
164. E.g., Statement of Hon. Ron Paul, supra note 86, at 39 ("Clinton plans a series
of executive orders and changes to federal rules that he can sign into law without first
getting the OK from GOP naysayers. White House Chief of Staff John Podesta was
quoted as saying 'There's a pretty wide sweep of things we're looking to do, and we're
going to be very aggressive in pursuing it."'); James Bennet, True to Form, Clinton
Shifts Energies Back to U.S. Focus, WASH. TIMEs, July 5, 1998, at 10 ("In a favorite
formula for this White House, Mr. Clinton dropped his foreign trip cold upon touching
American soil and turned to domestic policy .... With some of his closest advisers
deeply pessimistic about the chances of getting major legislation passed during the rest
of the year, Mr. Clinton plans to issue a series of executive orders to demonstrate that he
can still be effective."); Hirsen, supra note 163 (noting Clinton's repeated assertions that
he will use executive orders until his last day in office to implement policies with or
without the cooperation of Congress); Murray, supra note I ("President Clinton seems
bent on using his powers until someone says stop." (quoting House Majority Leader
Dick Armey)).
165. Remarks on Medicare and the Legislative Agenda and an Exchange With Re-
porters, 34 WEEKLY ComP. PRES. Doc. 1329 (July 6, 1998).
166. Hearing on H.R. 3131, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Hon. George Gekas,
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stance, when the Children's Environmental Protection Act stalled in the Senate,
Clinton incorporated provisions from the legislation into an executive order that
he issued on Earth Day in 1997.167 When Congress refused to pass legislation
prohibiting employers from employing permanent replacements for striking
workers, Clinton issued an order implementing this policy instead. ' Unfortu-
nately, these actions have been just been the tip of the iceberg. 69 Such usage
completely ignores the principles that the Founders fought so hard to protect.
Intransigent Congresses are not hindrances, but rather safeguards from arbitrary
rule. 
70
Clinton may have misused executive orders more blatantly than his prede-
cessors, but he is, unfortunately, not the only offender. When FDR faced resis-
tance to his Emergency Price Control Act, he stated, "In the event that the Con-
gress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept the responsibility, and
I will act.4 71 An aide to President Kennedy similarly expressed the view that
Chairman, Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law) [hereinafter Statement of Hon.
George Gekas] ("There are allegations that Executive orders have been used, are being
used, and will be used to circumvent so-called 'intransigent' Congresses."); see also
Grigg, supra note 104 ("'It's been a mark of the Clinton administration to rule by execu-
tive fiat, circumventing a hostile Congress by signing presidential orders that affect
everything from patients' rights to conservation to a war against Yugoslavia."' (quoting
Francine Kiefer, Clintonian 'Tyranny' Rankles Hill, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 9,
1999, at 1)).
167. Jack Kenny, Editorial, Executive Orders are "Monuments" to One-Man Rule,
N.H. SUNDAY, Jan. 16, 2000.
168. The executive order was eventually overturned. Chamber of Commerce v.
Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
169. For instance, when the Patients' Bill of Rights had difficulty getting through
Congress, Clinton ordered government health plan providers to provide federal employ-
ees with some of these protections. Clinton to Focus on Domestic Agenda With New
Directives, BULLETIN'S FRONTRUNNER, July 6, 1998. Clinton ordered federal officers to
keep trigger locks for their guns, ignoring the unresolved state of this policy issue in
Congress. Id. In the face of public debate about school vouchers, Clinton instead or-
dered an alternative solution to educational woes: that data be published on low-
performing schools and other monitoring efforts be undertaken. Charles Babington,
President to Sign Orders on Parents' Rights, Schools, WASH. POST, May 3, 2000, at A2.
Legislation protecting parents from discrimination in the workplace (based on the fact
that they are parents) failed to pass Congress. Clinton immediately ordered that this
protection be put into place in federal workplaces. Id.
170. Statement of Hon. George Gekas, supra note 166, at 3 ('The process for law-
making established by the Constitution means that intransigence by the Congress---just
like intransigence by the President--should stop the federal government from carrying
out new and different policies or programs.").
171. Monaghan, supra note 66, at 29.
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"[elverybody believes in democracy until he gets to the White House and then
you begin to believe in dictatorship, because it's so hard to get things done.
Every time you turn around, people just resist you, and even resist their own
job. 172
Perhaps some presidents abuse their executive power because they legiti-
mately believe their policy will help the country, while others do so out of frus-
tration or because they are blinded by power. The reason for the abuse is not
important. What is important is that policies are being imposed on Americans
outside of the democratic process. No good can come out of such a situation,
and, in fact, many orders have caused much controversy as a result.
B. Controversial Orders
Every president since the time of FDR has issued controversial executive
orders, and many presidents before him issued executive orders that were dis-
puted.173 Famous examples of controversial orders include Washington's neu-
trality order, the Louisiana Purchase, the annexation of Texas, the Emancipation
Proclamation, the internment of Japanese-American citizens, the desegregation
of the military, the creation of the Peace Corps, and various affirmative action
executive orders. 174 Although some uses have been more egregious than others,
no administration in modern times has been exempt from the criticism that it has
sometimes sought to make policy through executive order. Only three Presi-
dents have had executive orders overturned in their entirety by the courts. Of
these three, two of them are our most recent Presidents.
175
1. William Jefferson Clinton
172. Thomas E. Cronin, Everybody Believes in Democracy Until He Gets to the
White House: An Examination of White House-Departmental Relations, in CLASSIC
READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 38, at 371, 372.
173. For an in-depth discussion of controversial executive orders, see CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS, 106TH CONG., ExECuTrirvE ORDERS AND PROCLAMATIONS, 1933-99:
CONTROVERSIES WITH CONGRESS AND THE COURTS (1999) (completed by Louis Fisher,
Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Government and Finance Division) [hereinaf-
ter CRS REPORT].
174. Statement of Thomas 0. Sargentich, supra note 33, at 29; see also Murray, su-
pra note 1 (listing controversial executive orders).
175. The court order enjoining President Bush's executive order is still being ap-
pealed. See discussion infra notes 224-37 and accompanying text.
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President Clinton issued 364 executive orders before leaving office on
January 20, 2001. President Clinton may have issued more controversial or-
ders than any president in recent memory. During his time in office, he became
only the second President to have an executive order struck down by the courts
in its entirety.177 Clinton was regularly criticized for the unilateral decisions that
he made through executive order, and two characteristics of his orders made
them perhaps more problematic than those of many of his predecessors. First,
he often used his power to make policy decisions that should have been left to
the legislature. Presidents are executors of the law, not creators of the law. Sec-
ond, and more troubling, was his tendency to use presidential directives to im-
plement initiatives that had failed to pass Congress.178 The Founding Fathers
176. Federal Register, Executive Orders Disposition Tables, January 9, 1939-
March 19, 2002, National Archives and Records Administration, at
http://www.nara.gov/fedregleo.html (last visited May 3, 2002). President Clinton issued
fewer executive orders than the last two-term President, Ronald Reagan (381), but Clin-
ton's directives filled more pages in the Federal Register than Reagan's. Clinton added
more than 560,000 pages to the Federal Register-27% more than Reagan and double
the amount added by President Nixon. Pete DuPont, Undoing Midnight Mischief,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, at B3.
The last President to issue more executive orders than President Reagan had been
President Eisenhower, who issued 452. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 13 tbl.1.
President Nixon came close to Reagan's number with 346 orders, but he did not serve
two full terms as Reagan did. See id. The fewest executive orders during this time pe-
riod were issued by George H.W. Bush (166), Gerald Ford (169), and John F. Kennedy
(214). Id. Each of these Presidents served one term or less. Of those Presidents not
serving two terms during this time period, President Jimmy Carter issued the most ex-
ecutive orders with 320. See id.
177. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996). This executive
order banning the replacement of striking workers was the subject of much political
controversy before it was struck down. Several bills were introduced in Congress to
nullify the order. See, e.g., Fairness in Federal Contracting Act of 1995, S. 989, 104th
Cong. (1995); S. 603, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1176, 104th Cong. (1995); see also
Ronald Turner, Banning the Permanent Replacement of Strikers By Executive Order:
The Conflict Between Executive Order 12954 and the NLRA, 12 J.L. & POL. 1 (1996).
178. Editorials and articles in newspapers regularly berated Clinton for his use of ex-
ecutive orders while in office. For instance, they criticized the changes he made to rules
regarding homosexual service in the military and his establishment of procedures that
caused American soldiers to serve under foreign command during United Nations
peacekeeping missions. See Kenny, supra note 167. Other orders that were criticized
governed the civil service rules for workers with psychiatric disabilities, banned dis-
crimination against homosexuals in federal jobs, prohibited federal employment of any
contractor using products made by foreign child labor, revised food labeling, restricted
smoking in federal buildings, and intervened in transit strikes. See Murray, supra note
1.
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created a difficult and cumbersome legislative process as a safeguard for liberty.
Clinton's use of presidential power circumvented this process. A few examples
of Clinton's problematic orders follow.
a. Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Bush
In 1995, Congress considered legislation that would have designated 1.8
million acres of land in Utah as a wilderness; however, this legislation was op-
posed by state leaders and did not pass. 179 Clinton subsequently issued Procla-
mation 6920, which established the 1.7 million-acre Grand Staircase-Escalante
Monument in Utah-despite the earlier congressional failure to do so.1W0 Suit
has been filed by the Utah Association of Counties and the Mountain States
Legal Foundation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. In denying
Other orders criticized include: (1) Executive Order 13,112: Prevents the introduction
of invasive species on public property. The definition of "invasive species" was con-
tended to be too broad. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 18. (2) Executive Order 12,852:
Creates the Council on Sustainable Development. The order was intended to ensure that
Americans sustain the environment. See id. (3) Executive Order 12,833: Overturned
President George H.W. Bush's executive order requiring employers to notify employees
that they can reclaim union dues that have been used for political purposes. Id.; see also
Alexis Simendinger, What's at Stake, NAT'L J., Sept. 30, 2000. (4) Multiple executive
orders that have turned millions of acres of land into national monuments, sometimes
even in the face of opposition from state and national leaders. See Kenny, supra note
167. (5) Executive Orders 13,088; 13,119; and 13,120, which were used to wage war
against Yugoslavia in cooperation with NATO. Congress was merely informed. United
States participation in the NATO effort continued despite congressional refusal to au-
thorize the air war. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 7. More orders have been criti-
cized, but they are too numerous to list in any one footnote. See, e.g., Testimony of
Hon. Jack Metcalf, supra note 3, at 26-28 (citing CRS REPORT); Stephen Barr, Clinton
Revisits Gore's Reinvention-Which Gets a Rah, Rah, Rah From Shalala, WASH. POST,
May 23, 2000, at B2; Curb Government by Fiat, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.),
Feb. 27, 2000, at A16; Jo Becker, Montgomery Weighs Bias Legislation; Bill Addresses
Using Workers' Genetic Code, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2000, at B5; Ellen Nakashima,
ADA's 10th Anniversary Marked with Initiatives, Clinton Directs Agencies to Hire More
Disabled, WASH. POST, July 27, 2000, at A21; Phyllis Schlafly, Executive Order Epi-
demic, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1999, at A19; Scott Shuger, Breakups, SLATE MAG., May
11,2000.
179. Testimony of Hon. Jack Metcalf, supra note 3, at 26 (citing CRS REPORT).
180. Id.; OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 4. Clinton claimed authority under the
Antiquities Act of 1906. Testimony of Hon. Jack Metcalf, supra note 3, at 26 (citing
CRS REPORT). In 1997 and 1999, legislation was introduced that would have regulated
the procedure for declaring land part of a national monument. However, this legislation
did not pass. See Testimony of Hon. Jack Metcalf, supra note 3, at 26 (citing CRS
REPORT).
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a motion to dismiss the suit, Judge Dee Benson stated that "the president did
something he was not empowered to do."' 81 The suit is still pending.
8 2
b. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich
During Clinton's second term, his executive order prohibiting the perma-
nent replacement of striking workers was overturned. 18 3  President Clinton's
executive order attempted to overturn a 1938 Supreme Court decision interpret-
ing the National Labor Relations Act.&I The Court had held that an employer
may protect his business by hiring replacement workers and may refuse to dis-
charge these workers later if the strikers want to return.18 5 Congress considered
(and rejected) legislation to overturn this ruling multiple times before Clinton
issued his executive order.' 6 The executive order provided that the government
would not do business with federal contractors hiring permanent replacements,
as allowed by the 1938 Supreme Court decision.18
c. Order Implementing American Heritage Rivers Initiative
In 1997, Clinton instituted a program entitled the American Heritage Riv-
ers Initiative by executive order. This executive order preempted legislation that
181. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 5.
182. The case is still in its early stages. The most recent ruling was one by the Tenth
Circuit allowing six environmentalist and business groups to intervene in the lawsuit.
See Jacob Santini, Appeals Court Rules on Nuclear Waste, Anti-Fornication, Grand
Staircase, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 11, 2001, at B3. The Mountain States Legal Founda-
tion maintains a summary of the case's status at http://www.mountainstateslegal.com/
legal-cases.cfm?legalcaseid=39. A similar case, also named Mountain States Legal
Foundation v. Bush, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
The plaintiffs in the case claimed that President Clinton had no authority to designate
federal lands in Washington, Oregon, Colorado, and Arizona. The case was dismissed
by the District Court and is being appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. Updates on the status of this case are maintained by the Mountain States
Legal Foundation at http://www.mountainstateslegal.com/legal-cases.cfin?legalcaseid
=63.
183. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
184. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
185. Id. at 345-46.
186. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 4; see also Gordon Clay, Executive Abuse of
the Procurement Power: Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 84 GEo. L.J. 2573, 2576
(1996) (noting that the striker replacement issue became contentious as several efforts to
pass legislation before the executive order was issued had failed, despite Democratic
majorities in Congress).
187. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 4.
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had been the subject of hearings in Congress. s8 Under the Initiative, any land-
use decisions impacting fourteen designated rivers must first be approved by
"river navigators" appointed under the executive order.'89 Decisions by the river
navigators are made based on a variety of factors, including, but not limited to,
environmental impacts. 19° Suit was filed by several representatives in Congress,
but was dismissed based on a lack of standing.19'
d. Order Regarding Federalism
Another controversial order was one that reversed an order previously is-
sued by Ronald Reagan. Reagan had issued Executive Order 12,612, which
instituted a set of guidelines for government agencies to observe in its dealings
with states.192 The Reagan order made reference to the Tenth Amendment and
instituted a presumption of state sovereignty to be observed by federal agen-
cies.193 Clinton's subsequent Executive Order 13,083 reversed the effect of the
Reagan order. 94 Instead of endorsing a presumption of state sovereignty, it
outlined nine circumstances under which an agency may intervene and override
state decision-making. 9' The executive order was received with outrage by
congressmen and was eventually suspended on the same day that the House
voted to withhold funds for its implementation.196 A year later, a replacement
order was issued by Clinton. This order was more similar to the Reagan or-
der.' 97 During Clinton's years in office, there were several occasions when he
issued an executive order to get around a Congress that was "failing" to act.
Perhaps the most egregious facet of this particular executive order was that it
188. Testimony of Hon. Jack Metcalf, supra note 3, at 27 (citing CRS REPORT).
189. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 5.
190. Id.
191. Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F. 3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
192. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 6.
193. Id.
194. See generally Jennie Holman Blake, Note & Comment, Presidential Power
Grab or Pure State Might? A Modem Debate Over Executive Interpretations on Feder-
alism, 2000 BYU L. REv. 293 (2000) (contrasting Reagan's executive order on federal-
ism with the Clinton order that superseded it).
195. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 6; see also Robert Holland, Editorial, When a
2nd Term Prez Sought to Repeal the l0th Amendment, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Aug. 26,
1998, at A15 (discussing the "bizarre act" of President Clinton that "few know about,"
which stood Ronald Reagan's order "on its head").
196. See OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 6.
197. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 6; see generally Blake, supra note 194.
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went a step beyond "merely" contradicting Congress-it seemed to fly in the
face of the Constitution itself.198
e. Last-Minute Orders
Before leaving office on January 20, 2001, President Clinton issued a spate
of executive orders, 199 implementing new workplace regulations," creating an
international criminal court, 2°' setting aside land as national monuments, 2 and
198. Cf. Dick Armey, Stop Clinton's Roughshod Over Our Constitution, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Aug. 5, 1998, at A5 ("With a stroke of the pen, President Clinton undermined
the foundations of federalism. With a stroke of the pen, he repudiated a time honored
fundamental principle that rules this nation. By a stroke of the pen he gave a green light
to future unwarranted and unconstitutional national regulatory powers and actions. With
a stroke of the pen, he may have done irreparable harm to individual rights and liber-
ties."). As Ronald Reagan would say, "Well, there they go again." Id.
199. See BARBARA OLSON, THE FINAL DAYS 77-95 (2001) (discussing executive or-
ders issued in the final weeks of Clinton's term); Jim Landers, Sprint to the Finish,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 6, 2001, at Al (describing Clinton as "anything but [a]
lame [duck President]" as he "continues to pull all-nighters" and "pack[s] the Federal
Register with 29,000 pages of new regulations"); Bill Nichols, Judy Keen & Richard
Benedetto, Clinton Actions Annoy Bush, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 2001, at Al ("The incom-
ing Bush administration is becoming increasingly irked with a whirlwind of end-of-term
executive actions President Clinton is taking to lock in his policy goals."). Ari
Fleischer, press secretary for President Bush, described President Clinton as a "busy
beaver." Landers, supra; see also National Center for Policy Analysis, Clinton Admini-
stration's Rush to Regulate, Daily Policy Digest, Nov. 27, 2000 (describing the "rush"
to implement "wide-ranging new regulations affecting business, industry and the work-
place").
President Clinton added 7371 pages to the Federal Register in the first three weeks of
2001. Robert Pear, As President Bush Settles in, Rules About to Be Published Might
Now Perish, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2001, at A16. Of these pages, 3500 were added dur-
ing his last four days in office. Press Release, Rep. Rob Portman, Last-Minute Clinton
Executive Orders Should be Reviewed (Jan. 29, 2001). It is not unusual for the number
of executive orders issued by a president to increase during his last few months in office.
However, George Edwards, director of the Center of Presidential Studies at Texas
A&M, has noted that Clinton's schedule has been unusually "hectic"--even for an out-
going president. Landers, supra ("We had a lot of defeated Presidents-Jimmy Carter,
Gerald Ford, George Bush-who didn't feel it appropriate to be writing policy at the last
minute. But Clinton was not defeated."). Clinton may not have been defeated, but his
party and its platform were.
200. One executive order, issued November 13, 2000, seeks to protect keyboard users
from repetitive stress injuries. Landers, supra note 199; see also Press Release, Rep.
Rob Portman, supra note 199 (discussing the wide variety of issues addressed by Presi-
dent Clinton's last-minute series of executive orders).
201. Landers, supra note 199.
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overturning previous orders he had issued-to the benefit of Democratic staffers
departing the White House upon President Bush's inauguration. 203 Many of the
policies implemented by Clinton during his last days in office run directly
against policies promoted by President Bush during his campaign. 204 For in-
stance, Clinton's expansive use of presidential directives to place land off-limitsto development and drilling ran directly contrary to the (then) President-elect
Bush's policy of "striking a balance between conservation and economic devel-
opment. ' '2 5 Other actions ran contrary to Republican ideology as well. Late in
his term, Clinton signed three trade agreements with Jordan, Singapore, and
Chile. These agreements were filled with environmental and labor rights protec-
tions long opposed by Republicans. 206 Clinton's single-handed implementation
of policy running contrary to the expressed will of the voters in the November
2000 election makes Clinton's last-minute "blizzard" of orders seem even more
egregious and tyrannical. 207
2. George Walker Bush
202. More than half-a-dozen national monuments were created by President Clinton
during his last year in office. Douglas Jehl, G.O.P. to Press For Unraveling Of Clinton
Acts, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 2001, at Al.
203. See, e.g., Jim Vandehei & Jeanne Cummings, Clinton Overturns Rule Barring
Former Staffers From Lobbying, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2000, available at
http://interactive.wsj.comarticles/SB978060217823917086.htm ("President Clinton
overturned his own executive order barring former government employees from lobby-
ing agencies for five years after leaving their jobs, a potential boon for departing staffers
in Mr. Clinton's White House.").
204. The last-minute blizzard of orders by President Clinton resulted in a tug-of-war
between the two administrations. Since presidential directives are not effective until
they are published in the Federal Register, the Clinton administration worked furiously
to get as many pages as possible published before President Bush's inauguration. Once
inaugurated, however, President Bush put an immediate freeze on publication of these
directives and his administration began its review of the orders to decide which ones to
nullify. See Ken Fireman, Bush Era Set to Begin, A Promise to Seize the Initiative,
NEWSDAY (New York, N.Y.), Jan. 20, 2001, at A7 (discussing Bush's plan to issue ex-
ecutive orders intended "to nullify a host of controversial orders issued by President Bill
Clinton in the waning days of his presidency"); Pear, supra note 199 (discussing the
Federal Register's rush to publish followed immediately by a rush to halt all publica-
tion).
205. Jehl, supra note 202.
206. Landers, supra note 199.
207. Jehl, supra note 202 (referring to Clinton's "blizzard of last-minute orders on
environmental policy").
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As of the end of 2001, President Bush had issued fifty-four executive or-
ders.m Despite the fact that the country entered a state of war following the
events of September 11, 2001, the number of Bush orders still lags behind the
pace set by Clinton during his first year in office. President Clinton issued fifty-
seven executive orders during his first year in office.209 (Although it should be
noted that more of Bush's orders may be classified for national security pur-
poses, which would skew the numbers.) As noted above, however, the tenor of
the executive orders generally matters more than the number.
210
a. Pre-War Orders
i. Directive Implementing Policy on Mexico City
One of the first directives issued by President Bush reversed an early order
of President Clinton and reinstated the so-called policy on Mexico City insti-
tuted by President Reagan. The directive blocks funding of international family
planning groups that provide abortion-counseling services. 211 The directive was
issued on the anniversary of Roe v. Wade212 during the first week of President
Bush's presidency.213 (Presumably, the next time a Democrat is elected, the
policy regarding federal funding of abortions will change yet again.) The rapid
swings from one position to another-and, then back again-highlights the con-
fusion that can ensue when policy matters are left to the executive branch.21 4
208. See Federal Register, Executive Orders Disposition Tables: Administration of
George W Bush (2001-Present), National Archives and Records Administration, at
http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/eo..wbush.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2002).
209. See Federal Register, Executive Orders Disposition Tables: Administration of
William J. Clinton (1993-2001), National Archives and Records Administration, at
http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/eo._Clint.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2001).
210. See discussion supra note 149 and accompanying text.
211. See Ari Fleischer, Press Secretary to President Bush, Press Briefing at the White
House, Washington D.C. (Jan. 24, 2001) (noting that President Clinton signed an execu-
tive order rescinding the policy on Mexico City on the anniversary of Roe v. Wade in
1993 and that President Bush's actions therefore have "a certain symmetry" to Clinton's
actions); see also Laura Tolley, President Acts to Cut Some Abortion Funds, SAN
ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, Jan. 23, 2001, at IA (discussing Bush's decision to reverse
the Clinton administration's position on federal funding of overseas abortions).
212. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
213. See Fleischer, supra note 211.
214. It should be noted, however, that this author is in full agreement with the policy
decisions that were made by Presidents Reagan, Bush I and Bush II. It seems, however,
that the legislative branch should stop avoiding this politically contentious issue and
make such a policy decision itself.
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Policy decisions made by the legislative branch are not only harder to imple-
ment, but are also harder to undo. The Founding Fathers intended to leave pol-
icy decisions with the legislative branch for exactly this reason-difficulty in
changing the status quo protects the freedom of the people from arbitrary deci-
sion-making.
215
ii. Directive Regarding Stem-Cell Research
Perhaps the most controversial directive issued by President Bush to date
has been his decision regarding federal funding of embryonic stem-cell re-
search.2t6 In fairness, President Bush was forced to make a decision on this mat-
ter largely because he was seeking to negate actions of President Clinton that
had effectively taken the policy decision away from the legislature and placed it
in the realm of the executive.21 7 However, it would have been better if President
215. See discussion supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
216. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President on Stem Cell Re-
search at the Bush Ranch, Crawford, Texas (Aug. 9, 2001) (announcing his decision to
allow federal funding of research using only those currently existing stem-cell lines-
lines "where the life and death decision has already been made").
217. A failure to act by President Bush would not have maintained a policy created
by Congress; instead, it would have allowed improper presidential policy-making by the
prior administration to go forward unchecked. Research in which human embryos are
"destroyed, discarded or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death" has been
banned by Congress since 1995. Joseph Curl, Decision Likely Headed for Courts, Hill,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, at Al (quoting Samuel B. Casey, Human Life Advo-
cates); see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Bush Gives His Backing for Limited Research on
Existing Stem Cells, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 2001, at Al. In January 1999, the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (DHHS) ruled-questionably-that the 1995 ban
does not apply to embryonic stem-cell research. See Seelye, supra. In August 2000, the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), aided and abetted by the Clinton administration,
issued guidelines based on the DHHS decision. See Curl, supra; see also Seelye, supra
(crediting Clinton for instigating the NIH decision). These NIH guidelines skirted the
1995 ban by allowing federal funds to be used for embryonic stem-cell research as long
as federal money was not used to obtain the cells or destroy the embryos. See Seelye,
supra. The guidelines stated that such stem cells "are not embryos"; therefore, the ban
does not apply. Joseph Curl, President Faces Thorny Issue of Stem Cell Research,
WASH. TIMES, July 13, 2001, at A3. This author has a hard time believing that federal
financing of stem-cell research does not "knowingly subject[ I to risk of injury or death"
those embryos destroyed for their stem cells-regardless of who pays for which part of
the procedure. See Curl, Decision Likely Headed for Courts, Hill, supra. After the
guidelines were issued, a March 2001 deadline was set for applications for the federal
funding. See Nancy McVicar, A Question of Life & Health: Moral Concerns About
Stem Cell Research Will Lead to a Review by President Bush and His New Secretary of
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Bush's action had not been the issuance of another improper directive,21 8 but
had instead been an order issued with the sole purpose of overturning President
Clinton's unconstitutional actions and reinstating the congressional status
quo.
2 19
The actions of Presidents Clinton and Bush on the stem-cell research issue
exhibit another dangerous tendency of improper lawmaking by the executive-
once it has started, it is difficult to put a stop to it. One of the most interesting
aspects of the stem-cell decision was the lack of concern on the part of the citi-
zenry regarding exactly why the executive branch had authority over the mat-
ter.22 Once President Clinton illegitimately snatched the authority to decide this
issue from the legislature, few even bothered to wonder whether President Bush
actually had the responsibility (or authority) to take over the decision-making on
Health & Human Services, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, FL), Jan. 28, 2001, at 1G.
The March deadline, if nothing else, forced President Bush to take some action or to
allow President Clinton's policy to go forward unchecked.
At least one group immediately saw the improper nature of the actions by the Clinton
administration and took action while President Bush was pondering his own decision.
Human Life Advocates filed a lawsuit in March seeking to "declare unlawful" the NIH
guidelines instituted at the behest of the Clinton administration. Joseph Curl, Judge
Halts Stem-Cell Research Pending HHS Review, WASH. TIMES, May 11, 2001, at A3.
As a result of the lawsuit, Judge Royce Lamberth ordered a halt to the research while a
review of the guidelines was pending by the DHHS. Id.
218. Although it should be noted, again, that this author largely agrees with the pol-
icy decision that was made by the President. The issue, however, is not agreement or
disagreement with a particular policy decision, but rather the manner in which policy
decisions are made. The ends do not justify the means when the means are unconstitu-
tional.
219. The congressional status quo would be the 1995 law banning research that de-
stroys embryos and fetuses, which should be applied even at this early stage of embry-
onic development-at least until Congress determines otherwise. By simply nullifying
President Clinton's actions and affirming that the 1995 law applies, President Bush may
also have found that he could, without committing political suicide, accomplish the re-
sult he might have preferred-a ban on all embryonic stem-cell research, not just a ban
on stem cells from embryos yet to be killed.
220. This author conducted an extensive review of newspaper articles from January
2001 to August 2001. The review revealed little to no reporting on the basis for Presi-
dent Bush's authority. The President's authority to act was almost universally assumed.
For instance, at a photo op with the governors in late January, President Bush expressed
a belief that federal funds should not be expended on stem-cell research. Rich Brooks,
Pres. Bush Should Allow Continued Stem Cell Research, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB.,
Feb. 3, 2001, at B1. The question immediately put to him was "I assume that you'll sign
an executive order to that or make that the law ofthe land?" Id. The immediate reaction
that President Bush's sentiments could become the law of the land at the stroke of a pen
was a typical one while Bush was considering the stem-cell research issue.
[Vol. 28
President or King? Executive Orders
this issue. President Bush's decision was clearly one that will essentially legis-
late this contentious issue for the nation. Although the decision technically only
determines whether or not federal grants will be given for stem-cell research,22'
it might as well impact everyone. As with any scientific research, the amount of
private funding available is extremely limited.222 A decision with these kinds of
policy implications should clearly be made by Congress, not the President.m
iii. Building & Construction Trades Department v. Allbaugh
One last executive order issued by President Bush was recently enjoined by
a district court in Building & Construction Trades Department v. Allbaugh.
22
Early in his administration, President Bush signed an executive order prohibit-
ing federal agencies from requiring or prohibiting project labor agreements on
federally funded construction jobs.22 The order reinstated a 1992 order issued
by Bush 1,226 which had been revoked in 1993 by President Clinton. 227 Before it
221. E.g., Seelye, supra note 217 (noting that Bush's decision will not prevent pri-
vately funded research from going forward).
222. See, e.g., McVicar, supra note 217, at IG (noting that, for researchers, millions
of dollars ride on President Bush's decision since only a handful of private companies
fund embryonic stem-cell research); Jeff Pillets, Scientists Challenge Stem Cell Limits:
Join Legislators in Call for Reversal, RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), Aug. 17, 2001, at
Al (reporting that Wise Young, Director at the Rutgers W.M. Keck Center for Collabo-
rative Neuroscience, is considering ending his stem-cell research as the limitation on
funds may tie his hands).
223. In fact, many members of Congress have threatened to override the President's
decision. E.g. Pillets, supra note 222; Seelye, supra note 217. Senator Robert Torricelli
stated: "George Bush may have had the first word about stem cell research, but he will
not have the last word." Pillets, supra note 222. To date, however, congressional ef-
forts have not gone far and proposed legislation has not yet made it to the floor for a
vote. See, e.g., Stem Cell Research Act of 2001, S. 723, 107th Cong. (2001); Stem Cell
Research Act of 2000, S. 2015, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. Res. 414, 106th Cong. (2000).
224. 172 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2001).
225. Exec. Order No. 13,202, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,225 (Feb. 22, 2001), amended by
Exec. Order No. 13,208, 66 Fed. Reg. 18,717 (Apr. 11, 2001). The executive order was
one of four orders issued simultaneously that dealt with labor issues. The other orders:
(1) reinstated the Communication Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), re-
quirement that union workers be notified of their right not to pay that portion of their
union fees used for political purposes (Executive Order 13,201, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,221
(Feb. 22, 2001)); (2) dissolved the National Partnership Council created by President
Clinton (Executive Order 13,203, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,227 (Feb. 22, 2001)); and (3) elimi-
nated job protections created by President Clinton for employers of contractors at fed-
eral buildings when the contract is subsequently awarded to another company (Execu-
tive Order 13,204, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,228 (Feb. 22, 2001)).
226. See Exec. Order No. 12,818, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,713 (Oct. 28, 1992); see also Paul
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was enjoined, an incidental effect of the executive order was that it had effec-
tively resolved a dispute between the Governors of Maryland and Virginia, who
had disagreed on whether union-only work crews should be used for construc-
tion of the new Woodrow Wilson Bridge between the two states.228 In Novem-
ber 2001, however, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia overturned the executive order, making it the third execu-
tive order to be invalidated by a court.229 The order was invalidated partly on
constitutional grounds and partly on National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")
preemption grounds. 23°
President Bush's order is clearly no more, nor less, improper than the order
issued by Bush I, as both are essentially the same.231 Even if the Bush II order is
ultimately upheld by the appellate court, the two orders exhibit the danger in-
herent in attempting to use executive orders to make policy: Future presidents
will expand on whatever precedent is set for them and broaden presidential
power still more. The proponents of President Clinton's striker replacement
order justified it, in part, by claiming that it was valid if the Bush I project labor
agreement order was valid.232 Both the Bush I order and the Clinton order were
Bradley, Wilson Bridge Pact Imperiled, RICH. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 2001, at BI (discussing the
proposed executive order and the history of executive orders on this subject); Greg Gar-
land & David L. Greene, Labor Deal for Bridge Threatened, BALT. SUN, Jan. 31, 2001,
at IB; Steven Greenhouse, Bush is Moving to Reduce Labor's Political Coffers, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2001, at A14 (reporting on the four labor executive orders being consid-
ered).
227. Exec. Order No. 12,836, 58 Fed. Reg. 7045 (Feb. 1, 1993). President Clinton
also issued a memorandum in 1997, which directed federal agencies to use project labor
agreements when the agency determines that it will "advance the Government's pro-
curement interest in cost, efficiency and quality and in promoting labor-management
stability." President's Memorandum, The Use of Project Labor Agreements for Federal
Construction Projects, 1997 WL 309842, at 1 (June 5, 1997).
228. See The Bridge Impasse, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at A16 (noting that Bush's
executive order is a contentious one between Maryland and Virginia, which are splitting
the costs of the project); see also Garland & Greene, supra note 226, at lB (noting that
Bush's executive order will effectively block a project labor agreement negotiated by
Maryland Governor Parris N. Glendening and will instead open the job to competition
from nonunion contractors); Michael D. Shear, Wilson Bridge Labor Talks to Resume,
WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2001, at B1.
229. See Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 172.
230. Id.
231. See Exec. Order No. 13,202, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,225 (Feb. 22, 2001); Exec. Order
No. 12,818, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,713 (Oct. 28, 1992).
232. E.g., Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1333 (noting the argument of the gov-
ernment that President Clinton's order is valid under the Procurement Act, just as Presi-
dent Bush's order was assumed valid when issued); 141 CONG. REc. S3785 (1995)
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issued pursuant to the same statutory provision, the Federal Property and Ad-
ministrative Services Act (the "Procurement Act"), and can only be applied to
233federal construction projects.  Both orders implement policies in the face of a
Supreme Court holding to the contrary. 234 Both were issued to court voters by
implementing a labor policy yet to be successfully pushed through Con-
gress235 -although the Clinton order flew in the face of failed legislative at-
tempts to prohibit the hiring of permanent striker replacements, while neither
Bush order followed failed legislative attempts aimed specifically at prohibiting
project labor agreements. (Legislation has since been introduced to overcome
the Bush II order.236) Both orders seem to implement a "presidential policy...
in a manner prescribed by the President" rather than a "congressional policy...
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("Several Senators ... suggest that President Clinton's
Executive order prohibiting Federal contractors from permanently replacing lawfully
striking workers is completely unprecedented. They stated.., that there has never be-
fore been an Executive order that has prohibited Federal contractors from undertaking
an otherwise legal act ... [T]hese Senators are simply and plainly wrong .... In late
October 1992 President Bush issued Executive Order No. 12818 prohibiting Federal
contractors from entering into pre-hire agreements.")
233. See Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (Mar. 10, 1995); Exec. Order
No. 12,818, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,713 (Oct. 28, 1992) (claiming authority under the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act). The Bush II order relies on the same statu-
tory provision. Exec. Order No. 13,202, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,225 (Feb. 22, 2001).
234. See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors (Bos-
ton Harbor), 507 U.S. 218 (1993) (holding that project labor agreements are a legal op-
tion under § 8(f) of the NLRA); NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333
(1938) (holding that an employer may protect his business by hiring permanent re-
placement workers under the NLRA).
235. See, e.g., Bush Bans Nonunion Labor Bias: Move Seen as Effort to Shore up
Support of Builders' Group, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 24, 1992, at 5A (noting that
Bush's order won him the support of Associated Builders and Contractors, a group that
has challenged the legality of union-only agreements); Frank Swoboda, Bush Shifts on
Non-Union Contract Bids; Executive Order Goes Against Court Stance, WASH. POST,
Oct. 25, 1992, at A16 (reporting that Associated Builders and Contractors pulled its
support for Bush's reelection after the administration sided with labor unions in a Su-
preme Court case early in 1992, but endorsed Bush in October 1992 after he issued an
executive order prohibiting project labor agreements).
236. No legislation was introduced regarding project labor agreements until the 107th
Congress, with the small exception of an attempted rider on another bill during the
106th Congress. See Government Neutrality in Contracting Act, H.R. 2055, 107th
Cong. (2001) (prohibiting discrimination against a party that did not become a signatory
to a project labor agreement); Government Neutrality in Contracting Act, S. 962, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 1360, 107th Cong. (2001) (ensuring that project labor agreements
are permitted in certain circumstances); S. Amdt. 2905, 106th Cong. (2000) (requiring
project agreements on federal construction projects).
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in a manner prescribed by Congress. '' 23 Despite the fact that the Bush II order
does not seem to contravene the expressed will of Congress as directly as the
Clinton order did, both orders are regulatory in nature and neither are a valid use
of presidential power.
b. Wartime Orders
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush has used
his power extensively in the name of national security.238 These actions have
been met by a mixture of criticism, praise, and relief from the American people
and their representatives in Congress. Ironically, those actions that have been
most criticized often pose a lesser threat to the liberty of Americans than other
actions or proposed actions that have received less criticism. The erroneous
focus of this criticism seems to stem from confusion regarding the broader pow-
ers of the President against the nation's enemies during war as compared to his
more narrow powers in enacting legislation.239
Much of the discussion in this article has revolved around the President's
use of power in the domestic, legislative arena. In this legislative arena, the
237. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952). It seems
that the executive order expresses a presidential policy rather than a congressional pol-
icy, based at least in part on the fact that it apparently contradicts Congress's intent to
the contrary. See, e.g., Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. 218 (holding that project labor agree-
ments are a legal option under § 8(t) of the NLRA).
238. E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,236, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,671 (Nov. 29, 2001) (waiving
dual compensation provisions of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of
1964); Exec. Order No. 13,235, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,343 (Nov. 20, 2001) (invoking emer-
gency construction authority of 10 U.S.C. 2808); Exec. Order No. 13,234, 66 Fed. Reg.
57,355 (Nov. 15, 2001) (establishing a presidential task force on citizen preparedness in
the war on terrorism); Exec. Order No. 13,228, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,812 (Oct. 10, 2001)
(establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council);
Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001) (blocking property and
prohibiting transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terror-
ism); Exec. Order No. 13,223, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,201 (Sept. 18, 2001) (ordering the Ready
Reserves to active duty).
239. Cf. Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defend-
ing Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. (2001) (testimony of William P. Barr, Former Attorney General of the United
States) [hereinafter Testimony of William P. Barr] ("Much of the criticism of the Presi-
dent's Executive Order authorizing the use of military tribunals stems from a fundamen-
tal confusion between the realm of domestic law enforcement and the realm of military
defense of the Nation. This is not a confusion that has been shared by past Presidents,
past Attorneys General, or the United States Supreme Court.").
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President's powers are limited to his veto power,m his power as chief law en-
forcement officer,241 and his ability to recommend legislation for considera-
tion.242 In contrast, he has broader authority through which he may act in the
foreign arena. For instance, he is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,
and he is bound to use that power to protect the nation.243 The President's
power is, by necessity, extensive when he is acting to protect the nation from a
foreign enemy. The focus of this article has been on the importance of not al-
lowing the President to intrude upon congressional power; however, it is equally
important that Congress not be allowed to intrude upon presidential power.
Separation of powers is the best guarantor of liberty.
i. Order Authorizing the Use of Military Tribunals
Perhaps one of the most criticized executive orders has been the presiden-
tial directive authorizing the use of military tribunals.2" Much of this concern
has come from those who wish to protect the civil liberties of all-even terror-
ists.24 5 Other criticisms have stemmed from the belief that Congress should
formally declare war before the President takes such an action. 2  Certainly, the
President's powers would be clearer if Congress were to formally declare war.2 7
However, when the nation is attacked, the President's Commander-in-Chief
240. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
241. Id. art. II, § 3.
242. Id.
243. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
244. The directive was issued as a military order, rather than an executive order. It
can be viewed at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/print/20011113-
27.html.
245. Cf. EDWIN MEESE III & TODD GAZIANO, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: BRINGING AL QAEDA TO JUSTICE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRYING AL-
QAEDA TERRORISTS IN THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM (2001), available at
http://www.heritage.org/library/legalmemo/lm3es.html ("Such is our love of liberty that
[the AI-Qaeda defendants] invocation of the U.S. Constitution would be taken seri-
ously.").
246. Cf. Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defend-
ing Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(2001) (testimony of Kate Martin) (claiming that "unilateral issuance of this order... is
the most blatant example" of how President Bush has violated the separation of powers
since September 11 and distinguishing the use of military tribunals during World War H
when Congress had formally declared war against Germany and Japan).
247. DAVID B. RIVKIN, JR., ET AL., HERITAGE FOUNDATION, BRINGING AL QAEDA TO
JUSTICE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TRYING AL-QAEDA TERRORISTS IN THE MILITARY
JUSTICE SYSTEM (2001), available at http://www.heritage.orglibrary/legalmemolm3.
html (analyzing the difference between a formally declared war and a "limited" war).
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power does not await a formal declaration of war by Congress before it may be
used.2 The Supreme Court recognized this truth when it stated, "If a war be
made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but
bound to resist force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to ac-
cept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative authority. '249
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the President's Com-
mander-in-Chief power alone will support the use of military tribunals. 250 Nev-
ertheless, the traditional use of military tribunals as a tool of war, 251 combined
with the use of military commissions by early generations of Americans z indi-
cate that the Founding Fathers would have considered it one of the President's
options as Commander in Chief, at least against non-citizens. Former Attorney
General William P. Barr has stated:
It is anomalous to maintain that the President has constitutional authority to
order deadly'bombing strikes or commando raids against such an enemy,
while at the same time maintaining that, if the enemy surrenders or is cap-
tured, the President is suddenly constrained to follow all the constitutional
protections applicable to domestic law enforcement.
253
248. Of course, it is important to ensure that the President cannot declare his own
emergencies and broaden his own powers spontaneously; however, once an emergency
is determined to exist, as when the nation is under attack, it is equally important that we
not strip the President of his power to protect the country.
249. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862).
250. The primary case on point, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), declined to
evaluate this question. d at 29 ("It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to
what extent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create
military commissions without the support of Congressional legislation. For here Con-
gress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions.").
251. See id. at 28-29 ("An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of
measures by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize
and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or
impede our military effort have violated the law of war."); see also infra note 254.
252. For instance, in 1780, George Washington established a "Board of Commis-
sioned Officers" to try Major John Andre, an English spy who was charged with receiv-
ing information from Benedict Arnold. Testimony of William P. Barr, supra note 239.
Similarly, Andrew Jackson used military tribunals while a general and extensive use of
tribunals was made during the Civil War. Id.
253. Testimony of William P. Barr, supra note 239. In his testimony before Con-
gress, Attorney General Barr also cited several early Attorney General opinions, includ-
ing that of former Attorney General Speed: "The commander of an army in time of war
has the same power to organize military tribunals and execute their judgments that he
has to set squadrons in the field and fight battles. His authority in each case is from the
law and usage of war." Id. (quoting 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 297, 305 (1865)).
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Even if the President's Commander-in-Chief power, standing alone, is not
sufficient to support the use of military tribunals, Congress has upheld the abil-
ity of the President to do so in the Uniform Code of Military Justice
("UCMJ"). 25 The Supreme Court has confirmed that "[tihe trial and punish-
ment of enemy combatants who have committed violations of the law of war is
thus not only a part of the conduct of war .... but is [also] an exercise of the
authority sanctioned by Congress ... so long as a state of war exists ....
Similarly, the Court stated:
Congress has explicitly provided... that military tribunals shall have juris-
diction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war.... [T]he Presi-
dent,. . . by his Proclamation in time of war has invoked that law.... [m~e
has undertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon him by Congress,
and also such authority as the Constitution itself gives the Commander in
Chief....2M
The only question that remains unanswered by the Supreme Court is
whether the "state of war" in existence at the time of the President's order must
be one that is formally declared. 257 Some have claimed that the joint resolution
254. See 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1994) (providing that courts martial may try those subject
to trial by military commission under the "law of war"); Id. § 821 (1994) (providing that
courts martial are not to deprive military commissions of their jurisdiction); Id. § 836
(delegating authority to the President to prescribe trial procedures, including modes of
proof, for military commissions).
255. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1946).
256. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28. Some claim that Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (Wall.)
(1866), creates a conflicting precedent prohibiting the use of military commissions when
other courts are open. However, the better interpretation of the two is that Quirin stands
for the proposition that "unlawful belligerents" may be tried by military tribunals while
"traitorous civilians" must be tried in Article III courts. For a discussion of the two
cases, see GEORGE TERWILLIGER ET AL., THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES, THE WAR ON TERRORISM: LAW ENFORCEMENT OR NATIONAL
SECURITY? (2001), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/military-
tribunals.htm; see also RIvKIN ET AL., supra note 247 (differentiating between the gen-
eral rule of Milligan that civilians are not normally subject to military justice and the
Quirin exception by which unlawful combatants during a time of war may be subject to
military tribunals).
257. Quirin did not discuss what state of war is necessary. At the time of the deci-
sion, the country was in a formally declared state of war, and it was unnecessary. For a
discussion of the validity of military tribunals in a "limited" or "partial" war, see gener-
ally RivKiN ET AL., supra note 247 (noting the difficulty in determining what the Su-
preme Court would do in the current situation, as Quiin was decided during a formally
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issued by Congress on September 18 is sufficient to uphold the President's au-
thority.258 Others claim that military tribunals are a valid exercise of power,
even in a "limited" war.259 In addition, there is an argument that it was unneces-
sary for Congress to formally declare war, as the country was involuntarily
plunged into a state of war upon being attacked. 26° Either way, President Bush's
claim that he is authorized to exercise this military power in protection of the
nation is a reasonable claim.2  Given the expansive powers accorded to the
President as Commander in Chief and the fact that the crisis was not one de-
clared by the President himself to broaden his own powers, this exercise of ex-
ecutive authority is not nearly as troublesome as some other uses of executive
power have been.
ii. Federalization of Aviation Security
Despite the furor over the President's decision to authorize the use of mili-
tary tribunals, little has been said about the executive order improving aviation
security that was nearly issued by the President. In the weeks following Sep-
tember 11, the airlines, many American citizens, and the Bush administration
called upon Congress to pass a bill improving aviation security in airports. 262
The legislation stalled for weeks, as congressmen and senators wrangled over
whether or not the security workforce in airports should be federalized. 63 Dur-
declared war and the Court has become more protective of civil liberties in recent years).
258. Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (declaring that it is "both necessary and appropriate that the United States exer-
cise its rights to self-defense"); see also Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving
Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (presenting various views on whether the joint
resolution authorizes the use of military tribunals).
259. RIVKiN ET AL., supra note 247 (noting that there is a valid argument that a lim-
ited war included the right to subject unlawful combatants to military courts).
260. E.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 668 (1862).
261. Policy arguments regarding whether tribunals should or should not be used are a
different matter. There are valid reasons on either side. Some argue that civil rights
must be accorded to all and that a military tribunal cannot afford all the protections nec-
essary for a fair trial. Others note that national security concerns are of paramount im-
portance and that military tribunals are necessary to protect American intelligence
agents. Either way, the policy decision has already been made by Congress.
262. E.g., Carrie Johnson, Flight Attendants Increasingly Demanding Greater Safe-
guards, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2001, at A21; President George W. Bush, Radio Address
of the President to the Nation (Oct. 27, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/10/20011027.html.
263. E.g., Juliet Eilperin & Ellen Nakashima, Security Bill Stalls in Congress, WASH.
POST., Oct. 13, 2001, at A6 (discussing tension between the House and Senate in nego-
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ing this time, House Republicans repeatedly used the threat of an executive or-
der in their (failed) attempts to force Democrats in Congress to abandon the idea
of a federalized security force. 264 In the end, despite these threats, a bill was
enacted that will federalize all airport passenger screeners after a one-year tran-
sition period.265 The bill also implements higher security standards on a variety
of issues.266
If an executive order had been issued in this instance, as urged by the
House Republicans, it would have been exactly the kind of executive order that
the President should not be issuing. 267 A war legitimately gives the President
expanded powers in certain areas. His hands should not be tied when it comes
to using his constitutional powers to fight the nation's enemies. In this instance,
however, the war would have been a mere excuse for an illegitimate presidential
action.268 The President cannot use his executive powers solely for the purpose
tiations on aviation security provisions); Dana Milbank, Bush Expected to Back Federal-
ized Screening at Airports, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 2001, at A5 (reporting on ongoing
discussions between the House and Senate and the failure to pass a compromise bill).
264. E.g., Major Garrett, Bush Willing to Bypass Congress on airport security, House
GOP ally says, CNN.com (Oct. 29, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com2001US/10/29/rec.
airport.security (noting the statement of House Majority Whip Roy Blunt that "[tihe
President is prepared to do the Republican House bill by executive order"); see also
Eilperin & Nakashima, supra note 263, at A6 (reporting that House Republicans are
urging Bush to act by executive order).
265. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 71, 115 Stat.
597 (2001).
266. Id.
267. Yet again, this author is in agreement with the policy decision that Bush would
have made had he issued an executive order. Early signs of the impending failure of the
federalized workforce can already be seen. See, e.g., David Firestone, Rules Will Allow
Airport Screeners to Remain in Jobs, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 30, 2001, at Al ("After stoking
high expectations that the federal takeover of airport security would lead to a new breed
of airport security screener, one who was better educated and more qualified to assume a
position of increased responsibility, the Department of Transportation has decided not to
impose rules that would displace thousands of current screeners."). Rather than federal-
izing the nation's workforce, Congress should have sought a private workforce such as
those that have shown such success in Europe and Israel in recent years. Despite this
author's disagreement with Senate Bill 1447, a congressional vote was the proper man-
ner in which to enact this law. Any other route would have caused the implementation
of a presidential policy rather than a congressional one. President Bush would have
used an executive order to do an "end-run" around Congress. The short-term policy
would have been beneficial, in this author's opinion, but the long-term effect on the
growth of presidential power would not.
268. The President may have been able to take limited action to enforce congres-
sional measures already in place or to make discretionary decisions already entrusted to
him. If this was his intention, it was not so portrayed in the media. For instance, in the
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of circumventing an intransigent Congress, even in times of war. Lawmaking is
reserved to the Congress. Rather than focusing criticism on the President's le-
gitimate uses of his Commander-in-Chief power, Americans should instead be
attentive to issues such as those surrounding aviation security. It is in areas such
as these that past presidents have illegitimately expanded presidential power
during wars and crises.269 One of the easiest mistakes that President Bush could
make would be to inadvertently fall into the same trap, although it would un-
doubtedly be with the best of intentions.
Presidential authority during times of war is more expansive than it is at
other times. Criticism of some of the military actions that President Bush has
taken have not been justified. Presidential power has grown during times of
war, but it has not grown due to the actions of the commander of the armed
forces. It has grown when the President has extended his military powers into
the lawmaking realm. The threat to our liberty does not come from military
orders issued by the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. The threat to
our liberty comes when the President uses the excuse of national security to
inappropriately violate separation of powers in the legislative arena. Many who
have criticized President Bush's use of military tribunals have encouraged him
to issue executive orders in other, inappropriate areas, such as aviation security.
Identifying the difference between the two is admittedly a challenging task;
however, it is imperative that President Bush seek to achieve that balance in the
upcoming months and years.
C. Changes in Public Perception
Another factor contributing to the growth in presidential lawmaking is the
change in public attitude toward such action on the part of the President. Not
only does the public fail to condemn the President, but many people also de-
mand that he use executive orders to right perceived wrongs.270 As Professor
wake of the Pan Am 103 bombing and the loss of TWA Flight 800, Congress passed the
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, 110 Stat. 3213.
The Act mandated that new regulations be implemented to improve performance. Those
regulations never were implemented. Editorial, Pie in the Sky Security?, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2001, at A12 (detailing the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") to enforce regulations). Similarly, the President could have taken action to
ensure that the FAA, an executive agency, enforces regulations already on the books.
The failure of the FAA to enforce regulations is well known. See, e.g., Fred Bayles,
FAA Ignores Violations, Report Says, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 1998, at IA; Alexandra
Marks, Security Now Top Airport Priority, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 13, 2001, at
4.
269. See discussion supra notes 82-149 and accompanying text.
270. Monaghan, supra note 66, at 8; see also, e.g., Dan Horodysky, Letter to the Edi-
[Vol. 28
President or King? Executive Orders
Monaghan of Columbia University has stated, "That twentieth-century Presi-
dents and their advisors should hold expansive, and perhaps ill-formed views of
'inherent' presidential power is not surprising. Most Americans expect modem
presidents to provide solutions for every significant political, military, social,
and economic problem." 27' Since the inception of the war against terrorism, the
American people have seemingly been leaning on President Bush still more.
The perception of Americans that the President is not only willing, but also
able to solve their problems is reinforced by the media and by the political proc-
ess. During this past presidential campaign, candidates promised solutions to
virtually every conceivable social ill. One exchange between Bill Bradley and
Vice President Gore during a Democratic debate provides a good- illustration
both of the problem and also how Americans have come to expect their presi-
dents to make policy decisions without Congress:
Mr. BRADLEY: .... If I were president of the United States, I would
put an executive order in immediately that would end racial profiling in the
federal government. I would work to get local police departments to keep
data to be able to demonstrate that there was racial profiling. And then I'd
sic the Justice Department after them to make sure they were going to abide
by the law in which no racial profiling [would be allowed].
Vice Pres. GORE: I said at the beginning of my campaign for president
that on the first day of the Gore presidency I would issue an executive order
to ban racial profiling, and the first civil rights bill introduced from the White
House of the year 2001 would be a bill outlawing racial profiling.
Mr. BRADLEY: You know, Al, I know that you would issue an order
to end racial profiling if you were president of the United States. But we
have a president now. You serve with him. I want you to walk down that
hallway, walk into his office and say, "Sign this executive order today!"
2
The public perception problem is not limited to promises by political can-
didates. Congressmen and private citizens besiege the President with demands
tor, Justice for Mariners, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 29, 1998, at A6 ("Mr. President, you can
right this injustice with a stroke of the pen. How can we reach you?").
271. Monaghan, supra note 66, at 8.
272. ABC News: Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 17, 2000). Upon being
asked if he would sign an executive order banning racial profiling by police, President
Bush promised only to "look" into it. Marilyn Rauber, Dubya Treads Gingerly on Race
Profiling, N.Y. POST, Feb. 10, 2001, at 12.
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that action be taken on various issues.273 To make matters worse, once a presi-
dent has signed an executive order, he often makes it impossible for a subse-
quent administration to undo his action without enduring the political fallout of
such a reversal. For instance, President Clinton issued a slew of executive or-
ders on environmental issues in the weeks before he left office.274 Many were
controversial and the need for the policies he instituted was debatable.7 5 Never-
theless, President Bush found himself unable to reverse the orders without in-
voking the ire of environmentalists across the country. 276 A policy became law
by the action of one man without the healthy debate and discussion in Congress
intended by the Framers. Subsequent presidents undo this policy and send the
matter to Congress for such debate only at their own peril. This is not the way it
is supposed to be.
Restoration of our system of separation of powers will require that the pub-
lic be educated on what does-and does not--constitute a constitutional use of
executive orders and other presidential directives. Americans and our elected
273. E.g., Cleary, supra note 85 ("Well, it would take just one stroke of that pen to
mandate that the federal government couldn't do business with any firm that didn't
comply with the guidelines .... There is nothing stopping Clinton from signing that
executive order today."). Citizens are not alone in sending requests to the President.
Congressmen, the very people who should be holding the President accountable not to
abuse presidential authority, have gotten on the bandwagon as well. Rep. Frank Wolf,
Republican from Virginia, encouraged President Clinton to sign an executive order re-
quiring all federal agencies to offer transit subsidies to employees. Mike Causey, Un-
ions Hope to Make Hay During the Heat of an Election Year, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
2000, at B7. He later encouraged Clinton to issue an executive order expanding tele-
work opportunities for federal employees; he said that he would ask Congress to pass
comparable legislation only if the administration "balks." Stephen Barr, Pushing to
Ease the Switch From Long Drive to Hard Drive, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2000, at B2.
274. E.g., Lee Anderson, Mr. Clinton's 'Arsenic Water' Booby Trap, CHATTANOOGA
TIMEs, Apr. 24, 2001, at B7 ("President Bill Clinton, fortunately, is gone from the
White House. But, unfortunately, he cannot be forgotten. As he departed, he left a
number of political booby traps lying around .... Just hours before he was to leave of-
fice ... [he was] rushing through 'executive orders' on a variety of controversial is-
sues."); The Edge With Paula Zahn (Fox television broadcast, Apr. 27, 2001) (recording
statement of ex-presidential candidate Gary Bauer that the Clinton administration "set a
bunch of time bombs before it left" in regard to environmental issues "for one reason,
and that was to provide fodder for the Democrats in Congress when President Bush
repealed some of these things").
275. E.g., Anderson, supra note 274, at B7 (noting that the arsenic standard for wa-
ter-an allowable fifty parts per billion-had remained unchanged since 1942 and
throughout the eight years of Clinton's administration before it suddenly became a mat-
ter of extreme importance that the standard be lowered in January 2001).
276. E.g., id (reporting that the "predictable liberal 'environmentalists' went hysteri-
cal, screaming, in effect, that Mr. Bush was trying to poison the American people!").
[Vol. 28
President or King? Executive Orders
officials must quit looking to the President for quick solutions to hard problems
that should instead be debated in Congress. Difficulty in getting policies out of
Congress is a good difficulty to have277 and an important safeguard that our
Founding Fathers incorporated into the Constitution. Americans must begin to
view it as such.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL USES OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS
From the inception of our republic through 1999, only 253 presidential di-
rectives had been modified or revoked, either by Congress or by the courts. A
Cato Institute study completed late in 1999 found that Congress had modified or
revoked 239 executive orders, 278 while the courts had struck down only fourteen
orders, either in whole or in part. 279 The orders struck down by the courts re-
sulted from eighty-six challenges, 2 and only two orders had been wholly over-
turned.28' Since that time, one additional executive order has been overturned in
its entirety by a lower court.282 An expedited appeal of the order has been
granted. 283 Legislative and judicial challenges to several other executive orders
are ongoing.
In contrast to the number of presidential directives issued, few challenges
have been made. Even when challenges are brought, the most notable contribu-
277. In fact, one sometimes wishes that it were a little more difficult to get rules and
regulations passed by Congress.
278. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at app. 3, at 4 (listing executive orders that have
been modified or revoked by statute); see also Hearing on H.R. 3131, supra note 3, at
58 (testimony of Elliot Mincberg, Vice President, Legal Director, and General Counsel,
People for the American Way Foundation) [hereinafter Testimony of Elliot Mincberg]
(citing figures in reliance on Cato Institute study); Restoring Checks and Balances, su-
pra note 45 (reporting on Cato Institute study).
279. Testimony of Elliot Mincberg, supra note 278, at 58 (citing figures in reliance
on Cato Institute study).
280. Id.
281. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Hearing on Executive Orders,
supra note 33, at 129 (statement of William Olson, co-author, Cato Study); see also
Edwards, supra note 2, at 18 (reporting on the two executive orders to be contested in
the courts and contrasting them with other orders that were eventually upheld).
282. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2001).
283. Legal News: Department of Justice Granted Expedited Briefing and Argument
in the Appeal of Injunction in PLA Executive Order Case, Associated Builders and Con-
tractors (Jan. 24, 2002), at http://www.abc.org/page.cfin?keyPagelD=3718#eo; see also
Press Release, Associated Builders and Contractors, ABC Supports Justice Department
Appeal of Court Ruling on Bush Executive Order (Nov. 30, 2001), available at
http://I64.109.58.49/documents/AppealCourtRulingl 1-30.PDF.
20021
Journal of Legislation
tion of the courts has been its reluctance to get involved. Typically, courts up-
hold the presidential directive,284 find that the plaintiff lacks standing, 285 or hold
that the dispute revolves around a political question that should not be judicially
resolved.28 On those occasions when a court has modified or revoked a presi-
dential directive, the holding has often been fact-specific or the explanation for
the court's action has been brief.287 The result has been a remarkable dearth of
precedent and accountability in this area. 288 The lack of precedents combined
with the lack of challenges to presidential authority have resulted in a system in
which presidents have seemingly been "bound by only their conscience.
'289
A. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
The Supreme Court first overturned an executive order in its entirety in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.290 The case centered around an ex-
ecutive order issued by President Truman during World War II. When a labor
dispute threatened to result in a steelworkers' strike, President Truman issued an
executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and
operate the steel mills involved in the dispute.291 President Truman claimed
authority based on the national emergency created by a potential stoppage of
284. E.g., Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. ICC, 738 F.2d 1311 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980); Kaplan v. Cor-
coran, 545 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1976); Conservation Law Found. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp.
1467 (D. Mass. 1984).
285. E.g., Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
286. See infra Part V.A.
287. Cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) ("Perhaps it is because
it is so difficult to reconcile the foregoing definition of Art. III judicial power with the
broad range of vitally important day-to-day questions regularly decided by Congress or
the Executive, without either challenge or interference by the Judiciary, that the deci-
sions of the Court in this area have been rare, episodic, and afford little precedential
value for subsequent cases. The tensions present in any exercise of executive power
under the tripartite system of Federal Government established by the Constitution have
been reflected in opinions by Members of this Court more than once.").
288. Cf. Michael H. LeRoy, Presidential Regulation of Private Employment: Consti-
tutionality of Executive Order 12,954 Debarment of Contractors Who Hire Permanent
Striker Replacements, 37 B.C. L. REv. 229, 232 (1996) (discussing the lack of precedent
under which to evaluate the constitutionality of Executive Order 12,954).
289. Restoring Checks and Balances, supra note 45.
290. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
291. Id. at 583.
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steel production in the midst of the war. 292  After issuing Executive Order
10,340, President Truman notified Congress. Congress took no action.
293
The Court overturned the order, holding that presidential authority "must
stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself."294 Presi-
dent Truman had not claimed statutory authority. Indeed, Congress had rejected
seizure techniques as a means of resolving labor disputes in the past.295 The
Court found that President Truman's claim of constitutional authority could not
be upheld under any of the constitutional provisions granting authority to the
President-the "Vesting Clause," the "Take Care Clause," or the "Commander
in Chief Clause." Of the latter, the Court stated that the Commander in Chief
Clause cannot be used to grant the President "ultimate power" to "take posses-
sion of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping produc-
tion.' '296 The power belonged to Congress, not to the President.
Ultimately, the Court affirmed that the President is the "executor" of the
laws, not the "lawmaker." 29 The executive order issued by Truman was invalid
as it did not direct congressional policy "in a manner prescribed by Congress,"
but instead promulgated presidential policy "in a manner prescribed by the
President." 298 The Court held:
The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the
Congress alone in both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the
historical events, the fears of power and the hopes for freedom that lay be-
hind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our holding .... 29
The concurring opinions further reinforced the importance of a separation
of powers and the role of Congress as the lawmaker. Justice Frankfurter noted
the reliance of the Founders on a system of checks and balances to protect the
country from "[t]he accretion of dangerous power" in the hands of one who is
left "unchecked." 30° Justice Douglas added, "We pay a price for our system of
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 585.
295. Id. at 586 (noting that the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 had rejected an amendment
granting the President the authority to resolve labor disputes through seizures).
296. Id. at 587. Three justices dissented in the case. Justice Vinson, writing for the
dissent, argued that the President has an inherent power to act in times of crisis even
without express statutory authorization. Id. at 667 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 587.
298. Id. at 588.
299. Id. at 589.
300. Id. at 594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter went on to quote Jus-
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checks and balances, for the distribution of power among the three branches of
government. It is a price that today may seem exorbitant to many." 3°1 While
President Truman might have seemed a "kindly President" who wished to effect
a wage increase, a future president might later "regiment labor as oppressively
as industry thinks it has been regimented by this seizure." 3 2
Despite the numerous opinions issued in Youngstown upholding the inipor-
tance of a system of checks and balances, Justice Jackson's concurrence may
have been the most important, as it is perhaps the most thorough judicial evalua-
tion of the use of presidential directives, and it is often relied upon.30 3 Justice
Jackson outlined three areas of presidential authority:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authoriza-
tion of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate....
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent au-
thority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional in-
ertia, indifference or acquiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical mat-
ter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed
or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional pow-
ers of Congress over the matter.
3°4
tice Holmes:
"The duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty that does not
go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more than Congress sees fit to leave
within his power." The powers of the President are not as particularized as are those
of Congress. But unenumerated powers do not mean undefined powers. The separa-
tion of powers built into our Constitution gives essential content to undefined provi-
sions in the frame of our government.
Id. at 610 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926)).
301. Id. at 633 (Douglas, J., concurring).
302. Id. at 633-34.
303. E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (noting that Justice
Jackson's concurrence "brings together as much combination of analysis and common
sense as there is in this area"); Statement of Thomas B. Griffith, supra note 14, at 56
(discussing Justice Jackson's concurrence as a "helpful framework for analyzing execu-
tive orders").
304. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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No other executive order was overturned, in its entirety, from the time of
Youngstown until the administrations of Presidents Clinton and George W.
Bush.305 In Chamber of Commerce v. Reich,306 an appellate court overturned an
order of President Clinton's prohibiting the federal government from contracting
with employers who hire permanent replacements for striking workers. 30 7 Not
only did the executive order contradict both a Supreme Court ruling and legisla-
tion on the subject, but the court also found no validity to Clinton's claims that
the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act authorized his action.30s
In Building & Construction Trades Department v. Allbaugh, a district court
overturned an executive order of President Bush's based on similar reasoning.
3W
Although these latter cases each overturned an executive order, those opinions
have not provided much in the way of additional guidance, as the analyses of the
judges were aimed specifically at labor issues. 310 Today, Youngstown is still the
primary case dealing with presidential directives.
B. Applying Youngstown
The end result of Youngstown is that, at least nominally, a presidential di-
rective will be valid only if it stems from a statute or from the Constitution it-
self.3 1 If the order does not stem from one of these two sources, then Congress
305. As discussed above, at least one other challenge to an executive order has been
made and is pending. See discussion supra notes 183-87, 224-37 and accompanying
text.
306. 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
307. Id. at 1324.
308. The appellants claimed that the executive order was in conflict with the National
Labor Relations Act and the Supreme Court's holding in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel.
Co. See Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1332; Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
Mackay Radio held that "an employer retained the right 'to protect and continue his
business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to discharge
those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their
employment, in order to create places for them."' Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at
1332 (quoting Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345-46).
309. 172 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2001).
310. Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1332-39 (evaluating whether the executive
order conflicted with the NLRA and whether the order was regulatory in nature). The
court eventually determined that the executive order was "pre-empted by the NLRA."
Id. at 1339; see also Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 162-72.
311. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981) (quoting Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)); see also Allbaugh, 172 F.
Supp. 2d at 158 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585); Statement of Thomas B. Grif-
fith, supra note 14, at 55 ("Any individual executive order does, of course, require the
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must either ratify the directive or "acquiesce" in the decision before the order
will have the force of law. 31 2 Unless the President has independent constitu-
tional authority, presidential directives are always invalid when they are issued
in contradiction to the expressed intent of Congress and Congress does not ratify
the policy or acquiesce in the decision promulgated by the order.313 These stan-
dards are probably appropriate, but unfortunately, problems have arisen as a
result of Congress's broad delegation of authority, 3 4 the courts' often cursory
examinations of presidents' authority3'5 and their broad definition of "acqui-
esce, ' 316 as well as the difficulty of enforcing these standards against presi-
dents.317 This section addresses the standards that have been applied to presi-
exercise of legitimate presidential authority, either constitutional or statutory."); State-
ment of Hon. Ron Paul, supra note 86, at 39 ("'Because the President has no power or
authority over individual citizens and their rights except where he is granted such power
and authority by a provision in the Constitution or by statute, the President's proclama-
tions are not legally binding and are at best hortatory unless based on such grants of
authority."' (quoting STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6)).
312. See STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 24 (discussing congres-
sional ratification of the blockades ordered by Lincoln).
313. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588; FISHER, supra note 55, at 109 (noting that ex-
ecutive orders may not supercede a statute or override an act of Congress).
314. E.g., Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 n.5 (1974)
(citing statute granting authority: "'[the] President may prescribe regulations for the
conduct of employees in the executive branch') (citation omitted); Mow Sun Wong v.
Campbell, 626 F.2d 739, 742 n.6 (9th Cir. 1980) (evaluating a statute granting the Presi-
dent the authority to issue regulations "'as will best promote the efficiency of that ser-
vice' (citation omitted); cf. Statement of Thomas B. Griffith, supra note 14, at 55 ("The
scope of power granted to a president pursuant to a statutory delegation is, of course,
dependent upon the wording of the statute. Therefore, it is within Congress's power to
cabin the scope of statutory authority upon which a president can rightfully act. Indeed,
it is Congress's responsibility to do so.").
315. The Supreme Court has even gone so far as to relegate a finding of executive
authority to a footnote. See Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273
n.5 (1974) ("The Executive Order is plainly a reasonable exercise of the President's
responsibility for the efficient operation of the Executive Branch. Moreover, the Execu-
tive Order finds express statutory authorization .... ") (citations omitted).
316. E.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 677 ("Concluding that neither the IEEPA nor
the Hostage Act constitutes specific authorization of the President's action ... is not to
say that these statutory provisions are entirely irrelevant to the question of the validity of
the President's action. We think both statutes highly relevant in the looser sense of indi-
cating congressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances
such as those presented in this case.").
317. See MCDONALD, supra note 36, at 296 (noting that although executive orders
are supposedly only valid if justified by the Constitution or a statute, most go unchal-
lenged in reality). McDonald notes that from 1941 to 1951, no executive order was
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dential directives. Part V discusses the problems that have arisen in attempting
to enforce these standards.
1. Express Statutory or Constitutional Authority
To have the force of law, a presidential directive must have clear statutory
or constitutional authority.3 18 Where the claim to authority is based on a statute,
the inquiry into the legitimacy of the action tends to be fact-specific and may
involve a discussion of whether a delegation of authority was appropriate. 319
This type of claim is the most common manner in which presidents tend to jus-
tify their actions. 320 However, where the claim to authority is based on the
President's constitutional authority, academics differ on the appropriate basis for
presidential action. Some assert that a president may only issue presidential
directives in accordance with his enumerated powers in Article 1[ of the Consti-
tution. 321 Others claim that action may be taken based on so-called "inherent
declared invalid despite the fact that FDR seized aviation plants and shipbuilding com-
panies. Id. In addition, every president from Roosevelt to Nixon issued executive or-
ders prohibiting racial discrimination when such an action was not authorized and may
have, in fact, violated existing statutes. Id. Lastly, Kennedy used executive orders to
create and fund the Peace Corps-among other actions-yet no challenge was made.
Id.
318. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 9 (giving examples of orders with clear con-
stitutional or statutory authority that have been given the force of law). But see STUDY
OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 28 (noting that "temporary Presidential ac-
tions" of "doubtful legality" have been taken in times of crisis, despite the general rule
that executive orders must have clear constitutional or statutory authority).
319. Proper delegations of authority are governed by the "nondelegation doctrine."
A discussion of the nondelegation doctrine is beyond the scope of this article. However,
in its simplest form, the principle upheld by the nondelegation doctrine is that, while
Congress may delegate discretion in the execution of laws to other branches of the gov-
ernment, it may not delegate its lawmaking responsibilities. See, e.g., Loving v. United
States, 517 U.S. 748, 758-59 (1996) ("Another strand of our separation-of-powers juris-
prudence, the delegation doctrine, has developed to prevent Congress from forsaking its
duties.... The fundamental precept of the delegation doctrine is that the lawmaking
function belongs to Congress and may not be conveyed to another branch or entity....
"'The true distinction... is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or dis-
cretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."') (citations omitted)
(third alteration in original).
320. See Monaghan, supra note 66, at 14 (noting that the exercise of presidential
power is usually defended as merely an execution of congressional commands).
321. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 194.
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powers," "implied powers," or an "aggregate of powers." 322 Despite such asser-
tions that presidential authority may be implied, courts have failed to uphold
such a theory and instead require express, not implied, constitutional author-
ity.32
3
a. Statutory Grant ofAuthority
It is virtually undisputed that courts will uphold presidential directives that
are based on clear-and appropriate-grants of statutory authority.3 2  For in-
stance, President Washington's Whiskey Rebellion proclamation ordering
Americans to cease resistance to the collection of federal excise taxes was up-
held, as it had been issued pursuant to a 1792 statute empowering the President
to suppress insurgents. 325 Presidential authority supported by statute has been
upheld even in some arguably questionable circumstances. For instance, FDR
issued an executive order during World War II that required exclusion of all
persons of Japanese ancestry from a military area in the west. 326 The order was
issued pursuant to an act of Congress stating that "'whoever shall enter, remain
in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone prescribed,
under the authority of an Executive order of the President... shall... be guilty
322. STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 28. For instance, Hamilton
claimed that President Washington's neutrality order should be justified as valid under
the inherent powers of the presidency. Madison vigorously opposed such an idea. Id.
Additionally, President Theodore Roosevelt adhered to a "stewardship theory" of the
presidency whereby presidents may-and should-intervene for the good of the coun-
try, with or without congressional approval. Professor McDonald claims that the presi-
dents have intervened in twenty-five "major industrial disputes without specific legal
authorization, or even to the derogation of the law in some instances." MCDONALD,
supra note 36, at 295; see also Blake, supra note 194 (discussing alternative bases for
presidential action, such as claims that a president has a duty to the people to act for the
public good); Monaghan, supra note 66, at 14 (discussing presidential attempts to justify
action not based on a statute by claiming inherent powers, implied powers or an aggre-
gate of powers).
323. See STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS, supra note 6, at 28 (noting that the idea
of "inherent" executive powers has persisted throughout history, despite the failure of
courts to give legitimacy to the idea).
324. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952); Con-
servation Law Found. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1477 (D. Mass. 1984) (stating that
executive orders are valid if issued "'pursuant to either a statutory mandate or delegation
of authority from Congress' (quoting Indep. Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228,
234 (8th Cir. 1975))).
325. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 9 (discussing the Whiskey Rebellion procla-
mation).
326. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1944).
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of a misdemeanor.' ' 327 Despite the fact that Americans were being excluded
from their homes based on their ancestry, the Supreme Court found itself "un-
able to conclude" that the exclusion "was beyond the war power of Congress
and the Executive."
328
Cases do not usually revolve around whether or not presidential authority
will be respected when the President has exercised discretion at the direction of
Congress; it is typically understood that authority will be acknowledged in such
circumstances. 329 The question before courts typically focuses on "'whether or
to what extent Congress did grant... such authority' to the executive branch of
the government. ,330 Such authority may be found whether "[c]ongressional
authorization for executive orders . . . [was] 'express or implied.' 331 If the
President did not cite a statute as the basis for his order, the courts (or the gov-
ernment's lawyers) will often seek a statute on his behalf, thus validating his
exercise of power.332
327. Id. at 216 (citation omitted).
328. Id. at 217. Curfews issued under the same executive order were also upheld, de-
spite the fact that they were aimed only at those of Japanese ancestry. Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
329. E.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (affirming authority of the
President to prescribe aggravating factors permitting imposition of the death penalty
upon a member of the military, as delegated by Congress); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v.
ICC, 738 F.2d 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that an executive order of the President
clarifying the rate-setting authority of the ICC and approving certain contract rates fell
within the authority delegated to him under the Alaska Railroad Act); Mow Sun Wong
v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding statutory authority of the Presi-
dent to issue an executive order prohibiting lawfully residing aliens from serving in the
federal competitive service); Conservation Law Found. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467,
1470 (D. Mass. 1984) (holding that executive orders issued under congressional statute
had the force of law and enforcing the orders against defendants).
330. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 639 F.2d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting
NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 665 (1976)).
331. Conservation Law Found., 590 F. Supp. at 1477 (quoting United States v. New
Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 465 (5th Cir. 1977)). The court further stated
that executive orders have the force of law if they have "'some basis in an act of Con-
gress."' Id. (quoting Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835, 844 (1st Cir. 1981)) (em-
phasis added).
332. For instance, where the President cites "the authority vested in [him] by the
Constitution and statutes, and as President of the United States and Commander in
Chief," the courts have found statutory provisions to support the order. Kaplan v. Cor-
coran, 545 F.2d 1073, 1074 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing Executive Order 10,096, issued by
President Truman on January 23, 1950) (alteration in original). The court found that the
question of "whether the President had implied powers from the Constitution" did not
need to be answered as three statutory provisions "appear" to authorize the President's
executive order and none "appears" to "requir[e] a contrary holding." Id. at 1077; see
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Despite the tendency of the courts to justify the exercise of presidential
power where possible, there are occasions when an exercise of authority is
deemed invalid. Typically, orders are found invalid where a statutory delega-
tion is determined to be an invalid exercise of legislative authority,333 where
there is no statutory grant of authority to the President,334 or where a court has
not been able to feasibly imply such a grant of authority.
335
b. Constitutional Grant of Authority
Since courts are reluctant to accept claims of "inherent" presidential power
as a valid basis for unilateral action by the executive, the President must base
any constitutional claim on an express grant of power. Often, presidents seek to
base their authority for action on the Take Care Clause, the Vesting Clause, or
the Commander-in-Chief power.336
Where there is an express grant of authority, the courts will uphold the
right of a president to act on his own. For instance, when President Andrew
Johnson issued a Christmas proclamation pardoning those participating in the
rebellion, the Supreme Court acknowledged and upheld his express authority
under Article H to issue pardons.337 In contrast, if no express authority is
granted and no other claim to power is made, the courts are more dubious about
the validity of a presidential directive. However, the cases in which no claim to
statutory authority is made are rare. Typically, numerous claims to power are
also, e.g., Old Dominion Branch, 418 U.S. at 273 n.5 (finding presidential authority in a
footnote).
333. See supra note 319 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) ("Congress has declared no policy, has established no
standard, has laid down no rule.... If § 9(c) were held valid, it would be idle to pretend
that anything would be left of limitations upon the power of the Congress to delegate its
law-making function.... Instead of performing its law-making function, the Congress
could at will and as to such subjects as it chose transfer that function to the President.").
334. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d 138, 160-62
(D.D.C. 2001) (finding that Section 3 of Executive Order 13,202 is not supported by any
one of several federal statutes).
335. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 639 F.2d at 166 (concluding that, while the regulation
upon which an executive order relies grants authority for regulation of government sub-
contractors, the scope of this grant did not extend to workers' compensation insurance
contracts).
336. See Monaghan, supra note 66, at 14 (discussing the use of the Vesting Clause
and the Take Care Clause as a basis for presidential action).
337. Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. 154 (1871); see also OLSON & WOLL, su-
pra note 11, at 9 (discussing Johnson's Christmas proclamation).
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made, including the rarely accepted claim that the President has "inherent" con-
stitutional power.338
2. Congressional Acquiescence
Presidential directives issued without clear constitutional or statutory au-
thority may be upheld where Congress has later ratified the action. Subsequent
enactment by Congress gives the President's order the force of law if the charac-
teristics of bicameralism and presentment are factors in the congressional action.
Congress is held to have ratified the order if it either appropriates funds for en-
actment of the President's action, mentions the President's action in later legis-
lation, or explicitly ratifies the action by an act of Congress. 339 Naturally, Con-
gress has the power not only to ratify the action, but also to overturn it.34
First, Congress may ratify a presidential order by appropriating funds for
use in carrying out the President's directive. For instance, the President's au-
thority to transfer the administration and enforcement of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA") from the Secretary of Labor to the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") was upheld in Muller Optical Co.
v. EEOC.4' The district court, basing its reasoning on the Supreme Court's
decision in Isbrandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States,342 held that the transfer was
ratified by Congress when it appropriated funds to the EEOC for enforcement of
the ADEA.343 Similar justifications for presidential actions have been given in
other cases, such as EEOC v. Delaware Department of Health & Social Ser-
vices, which held that appropriation of funds constituted ratification of a presi-
338. E.g., Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614,
620-21 (D.D.C. 1980) ("The gasoline conservation fee at issue in the instant litigation
does not fall within the inherent powers of the President, is not sanctioned by the stat-
utes cited by Defendants, and is contrary to manifest Congressional intent. The Court
has no choice but to grant Plaintiffs the relief they seek.").
339. E.g., Muller Optical Co. v. EEOC, 574 F. Supp. 946, 953 (W.D. Tenn. 1983),
affd, 743 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Such Congressional ratification may occur when
both Houses of Congress either pass legislation appropriating funds to implement the
executive order or make reference to the executive order in subsequently passed legisla-
tion."); see also, e.g., Swayne & Hoyt Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297 (1937); Is-
brandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139 (1937).
340. The Cato Institute study found that 239 executive orders had been modified or
revoked by statute through late 1999. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 10.
341. Muller Optical, 574 F. Supp. at 954-55.
342. 300 U.S. 139.
343. Muller Optical, 574 F. Supp. at 954.. The court stressed that the appropriation
bills were approved by both houses of Congress and signed by the President. Id.
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dential order transferring enforcement of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 to the
EEOC.?
Second, Congress is said to have ratified the action if it approvingly refers
to a presidential directive in later legislation. In Isbrandtsen-Moller, one of the
disputes concerned the validity of an executive order abolishing the Shipping
Board and transferring its functions to the Department of Commerce. 345 The
Supreme Court upheld the order, noting that the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,
enacted after the executive order, referred to the functions of the Shipping Board
as "'now vested in the Department of Commerce pursuant to § 12 of the Presi-
dent's Executive Order No. 6166.'" '34 Ratification of an order was again upheld
in Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States on the same reasoning. 7 In that in-
stance, plaintiffs had sought to set aside rate schedules of the Secretary of
Commerce, alleging that authority to set the rates had not properly been trans-
ferred.3
4
Congressional acquiescence may also be implied where Congress has
passed legislation of the same "general tenor," but could not anticipate a specific
situation, particularly in the area of foreign policy. 349 The most notable example
of this situation occurred in Dames & Moore v. Regan, a case stemming from
the Iran hostage crisis.35 The Supreme Court held that previous legislation
"closely related" to this type of presidential authority evidenced "legislative
intent to accord the President broad discretion" in taking action during the
emergency.35' The presidential orders suspending personal claims against Ira-
nian assets were upheld.352
344. EEOC v. Delaware Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 595 F. Supp. 568, 573-74 (D.
Del. 1984).
345. 300 U.S. at 143-44.
346. Id. at 146-48 (citation omitted).
347. 300 U.S. 297, 300-01 (1937).
348. Id. at 300.
349. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) ("[W]e cannot ignore the
general tenor of Congress' legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the
President is acting alone or at least with the acceptance of Congress. As we have noted,
Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the Presi-
dent may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might act.
Such failure of Congress specifically to delegate authority does not, 'especially ... in
the areas of foreign policy and national security,' imply 'congressional disapproval' of
action taken by the Executive.") (citation omitted) (second alteration in original).
350. Id. at 662.
351. Id. at 678-79 ("On the contrary, the enactment of legislation closely related to
the question of the President's authority in a particular case which evinces legislative
intent to accord the President broad discretion may be considered to 'invite' 'measures
on independent presidential responsibility.' At least this is so where there is no contrary
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In some instances, courts have held a complete lack of congressional action
to indicate congressional acquiescence to the presidential order. In these in-
stances, congressional indifference to a matter is treated almost like congres-
sional approval. In Bailey v. Richardson, for instance, it was held that the Presi-
dent had the authority to establish procedures for "loyalty investigations" of
civil service employees.353 The appellate court held that the "President, absent
congressional restriction, may remove from Government service any person of
whose loyalty he is not completely convinced. '354 Since no congressional en-
actment restricted the President's action, the order was legal.
Naturally, Congress may directly ratify an action of the President; it may
also overturn the action unless the President's authority stems directly from the
Constitution and overrides any congressional authority over the matter.355 How-
ever, it should be noted that overturning a presidential directive requires more
than enactment of legislation according to the normal legislative processes. It is
not enough for Congress to have enough votes to simply pass a statute overturn-
ing the presidential order. It must also have enough votes to overcome the prob-
able presidential veto. This increased difficulty in overcoming presidential
orders is another danger inherent in broad executive powers.
3. Contradicting Congress
Perhaps the easiest situation to evaluate is one in which the President is
found not only to lack constitutional or statutory authority, but also to have
acted in contradiction to congressional action. The President has no authoriza-
tion to act in this type of situation, even in an emergency. 3M As Justice Jackson
indication of legislative intent and when, as here, there is a history of congressional
acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the President.") (citation omitted).
352. Id. at 686-88. The Court stated that it was "thus clearly not confronted with a
situation in which Congress has in some way resisted the exercise of Presidential author-
ity." Id. at 688.
353. 182 F.2d 46, 65-66 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
354. Id. at 65 ("It is our clear opinion that the President, absent congressional restric-
tion, may remove from Government service any person of whose loyalty he is not com-
pletely convinced.... We conclude that the Executive Order before us and the proceed-
ings under it violated no congressional limitation upon the executive power of removal;
that no constitutional right was involved in this non-appointment or dismissal; and that,
in so far as the circumstances imposed hardship upon the individual, the exigencies of
government in the public interest under current conditions must prevail, as' they always
must when a similar clash arises.").
355. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
356. Monaghan, supra note 66, at 24 (noting that the President cannot take an action
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stated, presidential action "incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress" is presidential power "at its lowest ebb. 357 If the President's action is
incompatible with the will of Congress, then the only possible justification for
the action is that it is based on presidential authority derived from the Constitu-
tion.35s Where such a showing cannot be made, the presidential directive must
be overturned.
A few cases have partially overturned actions because the presidential di-
rective, either in part or as applied, contravened the will of Congress without an
independent basis for presidential authority. Only three executive orders, how-
ever, have been overturned in their entirety. Of these, only one was overturned
by the Supreme Court. As discussed above, the Youngstown court found that
President Truman's executive order contravened the will of Congress and made
a policy decision that should have been left to the legislature in the absence of
independent constitutional authority granted to the President. 359 For this reason,
the executive order was overturned.
Two other executive orders have been overturned by lower courts. The
courts in Chamber of Commerce v. Reich360 and Building & Construction
Trades Department v. Allbaugh36 1 each overturned an executive order on the
grounds that it conflicted with the NLRA. 362 In the Chamber of Commerce case,
decided in 1996, the President made no specific claim of independent constitu-
tional power;363 instead, he based his primary claim of authority on the Pro-
curement Act.364 The court rejected the government's claim that the Procure-
ment Act could support President Clinton's authority in this instance. It instead
contrary to the expressed intent of Congress simply by claiming the existence of an
emergency) (citing Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804)).
357. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
358. This analysis was used in Youngstown. The Court found not only that President
Truman lacked statutory authority, but also that his action ran contrary to congressional
action on the subject. Id. at 585-86. Therefore, presidential authority derived from the
Constitution was necessary to keep the executive order from being overturned. Id. at
587. Since such a showing could not be made, the order was held to be invalid. Id. at
588.
359. Id.
360. 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
361. 172 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2001).
362. Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1339; Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 162.
363. The executive order generally cited the President's authority as derived from
"the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including [the Procure-
ment Act]." Exec. Order No. 12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (Mar. 10, 1995). However,
counsel for the government relied upon the statutory claim of authority in arguing its
case.
364. See Chamber of Commerce, 74 F.3d at 1324.
[Vol. 28
President or King? Executive Orders
determined that, under rules of statutory construction, a recent (but general)
statute such as the Procurement Act could not "trump" an earlier (but more spe-
cific) directive of Congress found, in this instance, in the NLRA. 365 The court
observed that the "later statute displaces the first only when the statute 'ex-
pressly contradictfs] the original act' or if such a construction 'is absolutely nec-
essary ... in order that [the] words [of the later statute] shall have any meaning
at all. ' ''366 Accordingly, the Procurement Act could not support the President's
claim to authority in the face of the "unacceptable conflict" with another statute
that was found.367 In the absence of a claim of constitutional authority, no fur-
ther analysis was necessary. The President, lacking both statutory and constitu-
tional authority, could not issue an executive order that stood in contradiction to
congressional policy.
368
The second of these cases, Building & Construction Trades Department v.
Allbaugh, overturned an executive order issued by President George W. Bush.369
Multiple claims of authority were made by the government during litigation,
although the Procurement Act was the only specific authority cited by the Presi-
dent in the text of his order. 370 In arguing the case, the government abandoned
the argument that the Procurement Act provided support for Section 3 of Execu-
tive Order 13,202. Instead, it cited additional statutes and the President's consti-
tutional power "to supervise and guide subordinate executive officials" as a ba-
sis for the President's authority to issue Section 3.37' The court, however, re-
jected the government's claims that either the cited statutes or the Constitution
granted the President authority to issue Section 3 of Executive Order 13,202.372
365. Id. at 1333.
366. Id. (quoting Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988) (quoting
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976))) (alterations in original).
367. Id. To determine whether there was an "unacceptable conflict," the court turned
to the "body of Supreme Court cases that mark out the boundaries of the field occupied
by the NLR..... [referred to as] the NLRA 'pre-emption doctrine."' Id. at 1333-34.
368. Indeed, the Chamber of Commerce court deemed President Clinton's order
"regulatory in nature." Id. at 1339. In the words of the Youngstown court, the order
executed a "presidential policy ... in a manner prescribed by the President" rather than
a "congressional policy... in a manner prescribed by Congress." Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952).
369. 172 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D.D.C. 2001).
370. The order cited "the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, in-
cluding the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act" as authority for the
President's action. Exec. Order No. 13,202, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,225 (Feb. 22, 2001),
amended by Exec. Order No. 13,208, 66 Fed. Reg. 18,717 (Apr. 11, 2001).
371. Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59.
372. See id. at 162.
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In the absence of statutory or constitutional authority, the court invalidated Sec-
tion 3 of the order as ,beyond the scope of the President's authority.,
373
Unfortunately, what the Alibaugh court began correctly, it then concluded
imprecisely. The court seems to have bought the plaintiffs' contention that "the
D.C. Circuit [in Chamber of Commerce] requires that an Executive Order in
conflict with the NLRA is [automatically] invalid under NLRA preemption doc-
trine and must be enjoined.",374 In accordance with this view, the last eleven
pages of the district court's opinion are dedicated to determining whether "EO
13202 [is] preempted by the NLRA.' ,371 However, the Chamber of Commerce
court was asked only to evaluate the legality of an executive order that was
based upon the Procurement Act and in conflict with the NLRA.3 76 The holding
cannot be extended further. As discussed above, the court determined that the
Procurement Act was essentially "trumped" by the more specific statute on
point, the NLRA;377 therefore, if the President's claim to authority was found
solely in the Procurement Act, his authority was non-existent. 378 Executive or-
ders issued based on other sources of authority were not addressed by Chamber
of Commerce. For instance, it is difficult to imagine that a court would auto-
matically invalidate an executive order dealing with a military labor issue, but
based upon the Commander-in-Chief power.
Presidential directives issued in contravention of the will of Congress are
automatically invalid; however, this is only so where there is no independent
claim of authority by the President. If there is an independent claim of authority
by the President, this claim must be evaluated. As Justice Jackson stated,
"[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or im-
plied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Con-
gress over the matter." 379 The President has his own constitutional powers. His
authority is not derived solely from congressional delegation; therefore, simple
contradiction of congressional action is not enough. The President must also
lack his own independent authority over the matter. The Chamber of Commerce
court appears to have caught this caveat, while the A lbaugh court missed it.
C. Other Separation of Powers Jurisprudence
373. Id.
374. Id. at 146.
375. Id. at 162.
376. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332-39 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
377. See id. at 1333-34.
378. Cf. id. at 1332.
379. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
[Vol. 28
President or King? Executive Orders
The doctrine of separation of powers has been discussed by the Supreme
Court in other contexts and may provide some guidance if the Court is ever
asked to clarify its position on presidential power. As is the case with prece-
dents on presidential directives, the line of cases discussing separation of powers
is somewhat limited. Some academics have declared that the jurisprudence sur-
rounding separation of powers issues is in "an abysmal state.' '380 However, the
Court has clearly expressed its resolve to uphold the doctrine of separation of
powers. In doing so, the Court has emphasized three main considerations that
will be taken into account when addressing a separation of powers issue.
First, the Court has emphasized the "single, finely wrought and exhaus-
tively considered" procedure deliberately fashioned by the Framers.38 1 Not only
must this procedure be upheld until and unless the Constitution is amended,382
but courts also note that the current system is one that was put into place by the
Founders because they deemed the protection of liberty more important than
"efficiency. 38 3 The Supreme Court has stated:
In purely practical terms, it is obviously easier for action to be taken by one
House without submission to the President; but it is crystal clear from the re-
cords of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the
Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency. The records of the Con-
vention and debates in the States preceding ratification underscore the com-
380. E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 506, 506 (1989).
381. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1982) ("It emerges clearly that the prescrip-
tion for legislative action in Art. I, §§ 1, 7, represents the Framers' decision that the
legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure."); see also Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998) ("Third, our decision rests on the narrow ground
that the procedures authorized by the Line Item Veto Act are not authorized by the Con-
stitution. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 is a 500-page document that became 'Pub-
lic Law 105-33' after three procedural steps were taken: (1) a bill containing its exact
text was approved by a majority of the Members of the House of Representatives; (2)
the Senate approved precisely the same text; and (3) that text was signed into law by the
President. The Constitution explicitly requires that each of those three steps be taken
before a bill may 'become a law.' .. . Something that might be known as 'Public Law
105-33 as modified by the President' may or may not be desirable, but it is surely not a
document that may 'become a law' pursuant to the procedures designed by the Framers
of Article I, § 7, of the Constitution.").
382. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 449 ("If there is to be a new procedure in which the Presi-
dent will play a different role in determining the final text of what may 'become a law,'
such change must come not by legislation but through the amendment procedures set
forth in Article V of the Constitution.").
383. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
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mon desire to define and limit the exercise of the newly created federal pow-
ers affecting the states and the people. There is unmistakable expression of a
determination that legislation by the national Congress be a step-by-step, de-
liberate and deliberative process.
The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Con-
vention impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy,
inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made
by men who had lived under a form of government that permitted arbitrary
governmental acts to go unchecked. There is no support in the Constitution
or decisions of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and
delays often encountered in complying with explicit Constitutional standards
may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President.
384
Just as "efficiency considerations" have failed to uphold unilateral action
by Congress without presentment to the President, so unilateral action by the
President cannot be upheld as a constitutional exercise of the executive power.
Where there is a balancing test to be performed between efficiency and protec-
tion of liberty, the Constitution always falls on the side of liberty. It may be
"obviously easier" for action to be taken by the President without consulting
Congress in some circumstances; however, the Founding Fathers considered this
argument long ago and determined that "other values [ranked] higher than effi-
ciency."
385
The second consideration addressed by the Court is similar to the first, and
it emphasizes the stated belief of the Founders that preservation of a separation
of powers is essential "to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power."'386 Justice
Kennedy recently expressed this sentiment:
384. Id. at 958-59.
385. id. at 959; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) ("That this sys-
tem of division and separation of powers produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance
at times is inherent, but it was deliberately so structured to assure full, vigorous, and
open debate on the great issues affecting the people and to provide avenues for the op-
eration of checks on the exercise of governmental power."); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
386. Myers, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The doctrine of the separa-
tion of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by
means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.") (emphasis added).
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Separation of powers was designed to implement a fundamental insight:
Concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty.
The Federalist states the axiom in these explicit terms: "The accumulation of
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands. . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." 387
Separation of powers is "the absolutely central guarantee of a just Gov-
ernment ' 388 and is therefore endorsed and protected "as a vital check against
tyranny."
38 9
Last, the Court has emphasized that, while separation of powers is neces-
sary, a "'hermetic sealing off of the three branches of Government from one
another would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing it-
self effectively.'390 As Justice Brandeis stated, "The separation of the powers of
government did not make each branch completely autonomous. It left each, in
some measure, dependent upon the others . . .,,39 Therefore, a law passed by
the legislative branch is not valid unless and until the President has had the op-
portunity to exercise his "limited and qualified power to nullify proposed legis-
lation by veto.''392 In the same way, a court cannot uphold a law that stems
solely from the President. Both the President and Congress have their appropri-
ate roles to play in the legislative process.393 While the Court is unlikely to al-
387. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 450 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (alteration
in original).
388. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
Framers of the Federal Constitution similarly viewed the principle of separation of pow-
ers as the absolute central guarantee of a just Government. In No. 47 of The Federalist,
Madison wrote that '[n]o political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is
stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty."') (citation omitted)
(alteration in original).
389. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 748 ("'The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of
1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle of
separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny."' (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 121 (1976))).
390. Id. at 748-49 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121); see also Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring) ("While the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.").
391. Myers, 272 U.S. at 291 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), cited in Bowsher, 478 U.S. at
749.
392. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947 (1982).
393. Cf. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996) ("Deterrence of arbi-
trary or tyrannical rule is not the sole reason for dispersing the federal power among
three branches, however. By allocating specific powers and responsibilities to a branch
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low usurpations of legislative power by the executive, it is equally unlikely to
allow a complete exclusion of the President from his proper role in the legisla-
tive process.
V. A'ITEMPTS TO CURB PRESIDENTIAL LAWMAKING
Attempts to restrain executive encroachments into the province of the leg-
islature have been few and largely unsuccessful. Those who try to bring cases
before courts often find their cases dismissed for lack of standing. Congres-
sional efforts to curb presidential lawmaking have recently increased, but legis-
lation typically fails for a lack of support when it comes time for a vote. Unfor-
tunately, until the American people gather in large numbers and begin to de-
mand reform, the congressmen they have elected are unlikely to give this issue
of presidential power the attention that it deserves.
A. Seeking Judicial Remedies
One of the primary problems with challenging the use of executive power
through judicial methods is the likelihood that no court will hear the case.39
Courts will resolve separation of powers issues; however, they will not mediate
"political questions" or disputes that are strictly between the executive and leg-
islative branches.395 Many cases also suffer from an inability of the plaintiff to
fitted to the task, the Framers created a National Government that is both effective and
accountable. Article I's precise rules of representation, member qualifications, bicam-
eralism, and voting procedure make Congress the branch most capable of responsive
and deliberative lawmaking. Ill suited to that task are the Presidency, designed for the
prompt and faithful execution of the laws and its own legitimate powers, and the Judici-
ary, a branch with tenure and authority independent of direct electoral control. The clear
assignment of power to a branch, furthermore, allows the citizen to know who may be
called to answer for making, or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions es-
sential to governance.").
394. Similar problems exist in seeking enforcement of an executive order against an-
other party. In these cases, standing will only be granted if the executive order itself or
the statute upon which it is based provides for a private right of action. E.g., Zhang v.
Slattery, 55 F.3d 732 (2nd Cir. 1995) (holding that there is generally no private right of
action to enforce obligations imposed by executive orders, but that a cause of action will
be found where a congressional order or the executive order itself creates private rights
of action); see also Lower Brule Sioux Tribe v. Deer, 911 F. Supp. 395 (D.S.D. 1995)
(holding that presidential memorandum was not judicially enforceable in a private civil
suit as it created no enforceable duty and was not based in congressional action); Water-
shed Assoc. Rescue v. Alexander, 586 F. Supp. 978 (D. Neb. 1982) (declining to review
case where executive order did not appear to grant a private right of action).
395. Sterling, supra note 137, at 123 (noting that courts do not usually address the
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obtain standing.3'9 Even where standing is found, courts may find that an action
of the President is not reviewable where the presidential directive was based on
a statute committing a decision to the discretion of the President.397 The reluc-
tance of courts to get involved may best be exemplified by the fact that only
three executive orders have been overturned in their entirety.
The most recent case in which a court declined to get involved was
Chenoweth v. Clinton.398 In Chenoweth, a group of congressional representa-
tives attempted to enjoin implementation of the American Heritage Rivers Ini-
tiative created by President Clinton after legislation failed to come to a vote in
Congress. 399 The representatives claimed that President Clinton's order "de-
prived [them] of their constitutionally guaranteed responsibility of open debate
and vote on issues and legislation."m The court, however, refused to reach the
merits, instead relying upon Raines v. Byrde'1 and holding that institutional in-
jury to the power of Congress does not grant standing in court.402 The court
held that disputes between the branches should instead be treated as political
disputes, as they have been historically 403
B. Congressional Action
Congress has fared only slightly better in its attempts to restrain the execu-
tive. Except when faced with a particularly controversial presidential directive,
Congress has not been able to effectively propose legislation limiting the scope
of presidential power. There are still many members of Congress who do not
seem to see the current use of presidential orders as particularly egregious.
When a bill limiting presidential directives is put to a vote, it fails to pass. Un-
fortunately, even if a majority of votes were scraped together and legislation
were passed, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to overcome a presidential
validity of executive orders); William J. Olson, S. 1795-The Executive Orders Limita-
tion Act, The Liberty Committee, available at http://www.thelibertycommittee.org/
sl795analysis.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2000) (discussing the reluctance of the courts to
get involved in "political questions").
396. Hearing on Executive Orders, supra note 33, at 130 (statement of William Ol-
son, co-author, Cato Study) (discussing the difficulty for plaintiffs in getting claims
heard on the merits when they are based on allegedly invalid executive orders).
397. E.g., Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 474 n.6 (1994).
398. 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
399. Id.
400. Id. at 113.
401. 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (failing to find standing when congressmen brought suit
claiming that the line-item veto is unconstitutional).
402. Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 115.
403. Id. at 113-14.
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veto.4' 4 As a result, it is imperative that President Bush, as well as representa-
tives in Congress, support the initiative to restrain improper presidential action.
While Congress has held hearings in response to particular executive or-
ders, it has been slow to address the issue of presidential directives as a general
policy matter.405 Fortunately, there are signs that Congress may remedy its pre-
vious failure to address means whereby the executive may be effectively kept
within the constitutional bounds. Whereas previous Congresses have not intro-
duced legislation relating to executive orders except in an attempt to repeal spe-
cific presidential policies, 406 bills have been considered in the 105th, 106th, and
107th Congresses. In each Congress, legislation was introduced to place re-
straints on the use of presidential directives as a general policy matter.4°" These
bills focused on such remedies as requiring presidents to specifically cite author-
ity for orders; providing for a thirty-day notice period before orders go into ef-
fect; granting standing to congressional representatives, state governments, and
individuals affected by an order;4m and stripping the President of his power to
declare national emergencies. 409
404. See, e.g., Curb Government by Fiat, supra note 178 (noting the difficulty of
overcoming a presidential veto on a bill curbing executive power); Murray, supra note 1
("In practical terms... a confrontation [between branches] ... would require Congress
to pass a bill blocking an order, then muster two-thirds majorities in both houses to over-
come a presidential veto of that bill.").
405. The exception to this statement is a study completed on executive orders in 1972
by a special Senate committee. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text; see
also OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 19. The study resulted in the passage of the
National Emergencies Act of 1976 ("NEA"), which ended all then-existing states of
national emergency and gave Congress the power to end future emergencies by joint
resolution. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 19. Congress also passed the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act, which limited emergency powers available to
the President when the nation is not at war. Id. Unfortunately, these acts did not have a
long-term impact. No emergency has ever been terminated under the NEA, and many
states of emergency are in effect today. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 18; Murray, su-
pra note 1.
406. See, e.g., Terrorist Elimination Act of 1998, H.R. 4861, 105th Cong. (1998);
The Federalism Act of 1998, H.R. 4422, 105th Cong. (1998); The State Sovereignty Act
of 1998, H.R. 4196, 105th Cong. (1998); Fairness in Federal Contracting Act of 1995, S.
989, 104th Cong. (1995).
407. The Separation of Powers Restoration Act, HR. 864, 107th Cong. (2001); The
Presidential Order Limitation Act of 2001, H.R. 23, 107th Cong. (2001); The Executive
Orders Limitation Act of 1999, S. 1795, 106th Cong. (1999); The Separation of Powers
Restoration Act, H.R. 2655, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. Con. Res. 236, 105th Cong.
(1998); see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
408. The hearings on the bills included discussions regarding the ability of Congress
to constitutionally expand standing in this area. See Testimony of Elliot Mincberg, su-
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VI. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
It is virtually undisputed that policymaking by American presidents has
410grown exponentially in recent years. While the courts and Congress have
made tentative attempts to restrain lawmaking by the President, these attempts
have, to date, been largely unsuccessful. 411 This is a disgraceful state of affairs.
It contravenes the intent of the Founding Fathers, who expected that each branch
would keep the others from overstepping their constitutional bounds. Madison
once expressed this sentiment: "But ambitious encroachments of the federal
government ... would be signals of general alarm. Every government would
espouse the common cause. . . .Plans of resistance would be concerted."412
pra note 278, at 60 (answering questions from committee members regarding the consti-
tutionality of granting standing as proposed by H.R. 2655). Professor Mincberg opined
that Congress had the ability to expand standing, but that constitutional limits would be
imposed in terms of ensuring the existence of a "case or controversy" and in granting
standing to itself or its members. Id.
409. See H.R. 864; H.R. 23; S. 1795; H.R. 2655; see also Heath, supra note 129 (dis-
cussing legislation in Congress concerning executive orders); Jena Heath, For Paul,
Another Lonely Battle: Texas Congressman Known as "Dr. No," AUSTIN AM-
STATESMAN, Oct. 30, 1999, at Al (relating statement of Rep. Ron Paul that Congress
should "flex some muscle" and restore the power balance between Congress and the
White House); William J. Olson, H.R. 2655-The Separation of Powers Restoration Act,
The Liberty Committee, at http://www.thelibertycommittee.org/hr2655analysis.htm (last
visited Oct. 26, 2000); Olson, supra note 395.
410. Testimony of Hon. Jack Metcalf, supra note 3, at 13 ("[I]t doesn't take an histo-
rian, a lawyer or even a politician, to realize that Congress has ceded, to the Executive
Branch, its fundamental Constitutional duty. I am alarmed at this action and by what I
perceive to be a "culture of deference" within the Capitol. By that I mean we allow the
President to in effect legislate through executive orders and proclamations. I find this
trend deeply disturbing.").
411. See supra Part V.
412. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 333 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1996) (emphasis added), cited in Sterling, supra note 30, at 110. Professor Sterling
notes that today's picture of a federal government acting in concert to circumvent the
Constitution would be unimaginable to our Founding Fathers. Id.; see also Bowman,
supra note 40, at 118 ("'The great security (said Madison) against a gradual concentra-
tion of the several powers in the same department consists in giving those who adminis-
ter each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other
cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack."').
Columnist Joseph Sobran, in discussing Madison's views in this area, stated:
James Madison observed that liberty is lost more often through gradual encroach-
ments than through sudden revolutions. This is also known as the boiling-frog princi-
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Madison was speaking of encroachments on the state governments by the fed-
eral government, but the same sentiment should apply when the executive en-
croaches on the legislative power. Signals of general alarm must be sounded,
and they must be sounded now.413
The American people endowed the government with power. They now
have a duty to ensure that this power is used in accordance with the Constitution
granting it such authority. Unfortunately, Americans have largely failed in their
duty to keep government limited to its constitutional bounds. In particular, they
have failed to rein in the President when he seeks to unilaterally implement pol-
icy without congressional approvaL Americans fail to demand that Congress
rein in the President; instead, they demand that the President act as their "ulti-
mate" benefactor. When Congress proves reluctant, they turn to the President to
dispense government bounty. Such demands are remarkably shortsighted. The
President dispensing bounty today may be a tyrant tomorrow.
414
The Founding Fathers instituted separation of powers for a reason: to se-
cure the rights and liberties of the American people.415  In limiting executive
power, the question is not whether a particular policy is reasonable 1 6 or whether
pie: if the water heats slowly, they say, the frog doesn't notice the fatal increase and
fails to jump out in time.
"I don't know about the frogs, but I keep an eye on people, and I've concluded that
they'll put up with anything if they can get used to it by slow degrees until they're
convinced it's the way things have always been. We've long since passed the point
our ancestors would have recognized as the dividing line between liberty and tyr-
anny."
E-mail from Chuck Muth, Editor, GOP News & Views, to ListMembers (Sept. 10, 2001,
9:42:5lEST) (on file with author) (quoting Joseph Sobran).
413. Cf Kenny, supra note 167 ("A long history of abuse of power hardly justifies its
continuance .... It was, after all, against 'a long train of abuses and usurpations' that
the colonists issued their Declaration of Independence."); Starr, supra, note 7, at 7 ("If
you don't respect our structure of government, the edifice erected at the Founding by
our wisest generation, then you do not protect our system of ordered liberty. May we,
now in this dawn of the new century, recapture our love for our constitutional system for
the structure that has allowed this great Republic to grow and prosper.").
414. Cf Bowman, supra note 40, at 118 ("It may be said with little fear of contradic-
tion that wherever the separation of powers principle is practiced it promotes limited
government, political liberty, and respect for human rights, and that where the separa-
tion of powers does not exist, where all power is held either by law or in fact by one
monolithic organ of state, the subjects groan, just as in Montesquieu's day, under the
weight of tyranny and oppression.").
415. OLsON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing the Founding Fathers' belief
that checks and balances and separation of powers serve as a protection from govern-
mental excesses).
416. Curb Government by Fiat, supra note 178 ("The issue in these actions [of Presi-
dent Clinton] is not the rightness or wrongness of the policies, but the limits to presiden-
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a particular President will use power responsibly. Instead, the question concerns
what kind of system should be put into place to protect the public from future
abuse of power. The importance of making institutional and structural, rather
than personal, decisions was emphasized by one Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, which eventually apologized for "commit[ing] the error of making a
personal judgment about how a particular President would [act] . . . [when] [i]t
should have made an institutional judgment about whether it was appropriate
under the Constitution to grant such authority to any President."' 417 James Madi-
son similarly emphasized the importance of preventing any executive from gain-
ing too much legislative power: ..... [I]f the equilibrium of the three bodies, legis-
lative, executive, and judiciary, could be preserved, if the legislature could be
kept independent, I should never fear the result of such a government, but I
could not but be uneasy when I saw the executive had swallowed up the legisla-
tive branch. '' ' ' '4 1s America is fast approaching such a point The equilibrium is
beginning to slip, and the executive is on a fast track toward swallowing up the
legislative branch What can be done about it?
Ultimately, the source of change is the American people Americans must
be educated, not only about constitutional structure, but also about the dangers
of straying from this structure. Sadly, there are few leaders available to imple-
ment this educational task, but perhaps those few congressional leaders aware of
the problem or our new President can take advantage of their access to the me-
dia to draw attention to this problem.
Once Americans begin to demand reform, it is the duty of Congress and the
President to limit their actions within constitutional bounds.419 As the leader of
our country and the head of the executive branch, President Bush should be the
first to propose reform for the manner in which presidential directives are used.
Particularly now, during this time of war, the President should be careful and
deliberate in his use of presidential directives. He should learn from the mis-
takes of former presidents who used power broadly during times of crisis, only
to provide precedents for future, improper expansions of presidential power.
President Bush should distinguish between those areas of foreign policy in
which he has been given more discretion by the Constitution and those areas of
domestic concern in which his power is more limited. Then he should work to
tial power.").
417. FISHER, supra note 55, at xi (citing S. REP. No. 91-129, at 23 (1969)).
418. Hearing on Executive Orders, supra note 33, at 128 (statement of William Ol-
son, co-author, Cato Study) (quoting Thomas Jefferson (quoting James Madison)).
419. Cf. Statement of Hon. Ron Paul, supra note 86, at 31-32 (noting that the Found-
ing Fathers expected each branch to defend itself from encroachments by other branches
and that Congress must protect itself since the courts have shown themselves reluctant
to rein in the President).
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convey that distinction to the American people and to clarify what basis he has
for any particular order that he issues.
If President Bush (or any future president) fails to limit himself to his
proper sphere of action, then Congress has several tools at its disposal. It should
use these tools to protect itself from encroachments by the executive branch.
First, it can-and should-be less generous in its delegation of authority. Any
delegation of authority should be precise and narrow.420 Other oversight
mechanisms may be implemented,42' and the possibility of including some
presidential action within the purview of the APA may also be considered.422
Where possible, sunset provisions should be incorporated into bills delegating
authority. Such strict restrictions on presidential power will severely limit those
presidential orders falling into the first-and broadest-area of presidential au-
thority: orders with express constitutional or statutory authority.
420. Hearing on H.R. 3131, supra note 3, at 53-54 (testimony of Thomas B. Griffith,
Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Testimony of Thomas B. Grif-
fith] ("To maintain the Framers' vision of separated powers, Congress must guard its
own authority as well, by delegating to the executive no more authority than is essential
to accomplish a set task .... Congress should not be surprised that the executive will
fully use any authority delegated by Congress and then some."); Hearing on Executive
Orders, supra note 33, at 8 (testimony of Douglas Cox, Principal Deputy Assistant At-
torney General, Department of Justice) [hereinafter Testimony of Douglas Cox] (dis-
cussing the ability of Congress to pass a contrary statute if it disagrees with presidential
policy).
421. In addition to responding to contrary statutes with contrary legislation or a lack
of funds to finance the presidential policy, it has been suggested that Congress require
the President to specifically identify the source of his authority when issuing an execu-
tive order. Testimony of Thomas B. Griffith, supra note 420, at 53. Others have sug-
gested that there should be a notice period after an executive order is issued. During this
time, Congress can review the order and "consider whether a congressional response is
necessary." Testimony of Douglas Cox, supra note 420, at 8; see also Testimony of
Thomas B. Griffith, supra note 420, at 53.
422. Interview with Professor Thomas Odom, Oklahoma City University School of
Law (Nov. 15, 2000) (suggesting that the APA be extended to the President when
executive orders are issued based on statutory delegations of authority). The Supreme
Court declined to extend the APA to the President in Franklin v. Massachusetts; how-
ever, this holding was based on the fact that the Act's definition of "agency" does not
make provision for either the exclusion or inclusion of the President. 505 U.S. 788,
800-01 (1992) ("The President is not explicitly excluded from the APA's purview, but
he is not explicitly included, either. Out of respect for the separation of powers and the
unique constitutional position of the President, we find that textual silence is not enough
to subject the President to the provisions of the APA. We would require an express
statement by Congress before assuming it intended the President's performance of his
statutory duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.").
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Second, Congress should be diligent both in monitoring executive orders
and in speaking to those that it disagrees with as a matter of policy.423 As it
does so, the range of orders that Congress can be said to have "acquiesced" to
will be limited.424 Additionally, where possible, Congress can pass legislation
speaking to the amount of independent responsibility that it does or does not
expect the President to take in certain areas. For instance, legislation could be
passed limiting the situations in which the President may or may not declare a
state of emergency. In conjunction with the legislation limiting declaration of
an emergency by the President, Congress can mandate that a state of emergency
may not be maintained beyond a certain period of time without the express con-
sent of Congress. In this way, the President will not be able to grant himself
authority by declaring a state of emergency at will.
Next, Congress can pass legislation granting standing to individuals or
businesses harmed by an unconstitutional presidential directive. In some in-
stances, the ability of Congress to constitutionally grant standing may be lim-
ited.425 However, where it can do so, it should consider making such a remedy
available.
The increased use of executive orders and other presidential directives is a
problem in modem-day America that should not be ignored any longer. Despite
the fact that the Constitution does not give any one individual an "executive
pen" enabling that individual to unilaterally write his preferred policy into law,
Americans, their congressmen and their presidents have acted as if it does. This
abuse of power cuts across party lines.
423. The Founders intended that the branches of government be separate, but
"blended" to further protect the freedom of the people. See discussion supra notes 54-
60 and accompanying text. If Congress appropriately monitors the President's participa-
tion in lawmaking procedures, it merely furthers the goals of the Founders under which
different departments are to "be so far connected and blended as to give to each a
constitutional control over the others... [that freedom might] be duly maintained."
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 343 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1996).
424. Of course, part of the problem inherent with the expansive use of executive or-
ders is that it is more difficult to pass a contrary statute overturning an executive order
than to pass congressional policy in the first place. This is due in part to the political
difficulty inherent in overturning certain policies-i.e. overturning a national monument
designation-and also due to the increased likelihood of a presidential veto.
425. A discussion of the issues involved in determining whether standing can be con-
stitutionally granted is beyond the scope of this article. Most likely, some individuals
and businesses can be granted standing on a case-by-case basis, but no "congressional
standing" can be granted. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997); Chenoweth v. Clin-
ton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Testimony of Elliot Mincberg, supra note
262, at 60-61 (questioning of Mr. Mincberg regarding the issue of standing).
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The Republican party is now in control of the presidency and the House of
Representatives. It would be a mistake for Republicans-who have complained
about the executive orders issued by President Clinton-to now further the
problem by issuing unconstitutional orders themselves. 426 Instead, Republicans
and Democrats should work together to enforce limits on the use of executive
power. Failing to do so may seem harmless to Republicans who now have
"their guy" in the White House; however, we, as a nation, should not maintain
such a short-term view of the use of executive power. Instead, we should adopt
the long-term view of the Founders who, in their wisdom, implemented safe-
guards to protect the nation against tyranny and arbitrary rule. If we do not, it
may be some time before we reap the consequences of our inaction, but as
President Rutherford B. Hayes stated, eventually "a Napoleon" will become
president, and our nation will then certainly pay the price.427
426. Some have suggested that President Bush should resolve the problems created
by Clinton's excessive use of executive orders by issuing his own executive orders.
However, inappropriate presidential lawmaking cannot and should not be justified based
on improper precedents set by prior presidents. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 103-
104 and accompanying text; see also Grigg, supra note 104 ("[Some people hope] that a
'conservative' Republican President would issue his own executive orders to supersede
whatever previous executive orders he disagrees with. Never mind that neither a Repub-
lican nor a Democratic President has the authority to legislate."). However, it is possi-
ble that the President may find himself faced with a situation, as with the stem-cell re-
search decision, in which failure to act does not protect the congressional sphere of au-
thority so much as it entails implementation of a policy improperly created by a previous
president. In general, President Bush should seek to curb the use of presidential direc-
tives as much as possible and should encourage more permanent, legislative solutions;
however this task may not always be as easy as it appears on the surface.
427. OLSON & WOLL, supra note 11, at 14 (citing WATSON, supra note 11, at 930n
(citing Interview with Rutherford B. Hayes, President of the United States)).
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